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ABSTRACT
The current but inconsistent upheaval in the Middle East suggests variations in what will topple
regimes, and thus in how regimes have laid the groundwork to remain in power. This thesis examines
variation in a social condition, relative dominance of a ruling ethnic group in a multi-ethnic society, as
the source for systematic variations in how a mono-ethnic regime will justify its rule to the general
population.
This thesis argues that the ruling group's relative dominance, defined as its relative percentage
to other groups in the population, drives a regime's justifying argument to be either rooted in the
presence of universally lauded institutions (democratic-institutional), the regime's demonstrated record
of economic and social developmental achievements (economic-social developmental), or the regime's
ability to further the interests of an identity common to itself and the population at large
(identificational). Relative dominance, it is contended, affects regime behavior by influencing the
functioning of two mechanisms: the degree to which a regime can tolerate public accountability and
the extent to which it needs to reduce the salience of ethnicity in order to endure. The thesis
hypothesizes that the former decreases and the latter increases as dominance decreases.
The thesis incorporates quantitative and qualitative analyses to measure and evaluate
relationships between relative dominance and justifying arguments. It demonstrates the existence of
relationships between dominance and regimes' justifying arguments by means of content analysis of
senior leaders' speeches in eight Sunni-dominant, Shi'ite-subordinate countries--Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq
(under Saddam Hussein), Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. Case studies
of one high-dominance country (the UAE), one medium-dominance (Yemen), one low-dominance
(Iraq), and one outlier (Bahrain) then illustrate the speculated mechanisms in action.
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In a world characterized by democratic norms and global advocacy of human rights, it is
surprising that we should still see a number of states exclusively ruled by minority ethnic groups. Less
surprising is that is that many of these states are currently experiencing popular unrest over the non-
democratic nature of the ruling regimes. That these regimes managed for so long to balance the
rational imperative of staying in power with that of international acceptance, necessary in the highly
globalized world, raises the question of the different strategies that mono-ethnic regimes in multi-
ethnic societies use to justify their rule to their population in the first place. The following pages
explore that very question, demonstrating that the relative percentage of the ruling ethnic group to other
groups in the population influences the justifying argument the regime will employ to lay groundwork
for its endurance over time.
I. Justification-How, What, Why
This paper takes as a starting point that all regimes that are not securely restrained by sincerely
democratic institutions will seek to remain in power. In doing so, their strategic options can be seen as
arrayed on a continuum, with pure repression on one end and democratization on the other. However,
the strategies at both termini are suboptimal for a rational mono-ethnic regime seeking to retain power.
While these regimes often make ample use of repressive tactics to consolidate and reinforce their rule,
repression alone is inadequate to build a foundation for longevity for two reasons. First, in today's
highly interconnected world, it is necessary to assume that all regimes strive for some degree of
While most of the regimes discussed here incorporate a few members of non-dominant groups in their regime as a
means of co-optation, the low status these individuals are generally permitted (albeit with exceptions) allows us to still
justifiably call the regimes mono-ethnic.
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international recognition, if only the lack of total rejection. The risks are overthrow from either within
or without. As Etel Solingen notes, even regimes that implement autarkic policies to reinforce their
2domestic popularity ultimately strive for international prestige to validate such decisions. As to risk of
foreign intervention, recent and more distant history are both peppered with demonstrations of the
danger of being a pariah state.
A strategy of pure repression is also suboptimal because it is costly--overall and in particular for
a mono-ethnic regime. As Weber and Rousseau both observe, generating obedience by compulsion not
only requires an unrealistic amount of resources, but is also unlikely to translate into a stable basis for
rule. 3 Moreover, pure repression is particularly high-risk for mono-ethnic regimes, where violence is
performed not simply by the state against the population but by one ethnic group against another,
reinforcing the salience of ethnicity and with it the fundamental illegitimacy of the regime. This
creates a cyclical trend toward more repression and, as a result, ever increasing instability for the
regime. As such, while repression will inevitably play a role in the consolidation of an exclusive
authoritarian regime, relying on repression alone to sustain itself in power is suboptimal for an ethnic
regime. This presumably becomes more so as the relative size of the ethnic group decreases.
If pure repression is a suboptimal strategy for monoethnic regimes seeking to stay in power,
democratization is equally so unless the country is fragmented into many ethnic groups (where no one
group is larger than the minority in charge of the autocratic regime. If other ethnic groups are
significantly larger, the proportion of power the existing autocratic regimes's ethnic group would hold
would give it less basis for influence that if it held exclusive power. Needless to say, democratizing in
one way or another is a worse option for a regime the smaller the relative size of its ethnic group. And
of course, democratization is not in the interests of the ruling clique, who might lose power to other
2 Etel Solingen, Nuclear Logics (Princeton: Princeton University Press) 2007.
3 Paul Brooker, Non-Democratic Regimes: Theory, Government, and Politics (New York: Palgrave McMillan) 2009,
100-102; Stephen White, "Economic Performance and Communist Legitimacy," World Politics 38:3 (Apr 1986).
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members of their ethnic group as well as to rival ethnic groups.
With neither pure repression nor democratization a good option, ethnic minority regime seeking
to survive must explore other options to obtain compliance from the population at large, ideally
planting roots for such compliance in a sense of rightfulness surrounding the regime's exclusive rule.
In other words, the regime wants to make people comply because they believe they should. They may
believe they should obey because it is morally right or because it is simply more beneficial than
disobeying.4 They will therefore try to justify their rule to the population, arguing to obtain the
compliance they seek.
This idea of a regime's justifying argument is closely related to the concepts of legitimacy and
legitimation; these are the terms in which the idea is generally treated in existing literature. While
there is certainly no dearth of literature on regime legitimation, there is very little that seeks to establish
systematic connections between the challenges to a regime's survival and its choice of argument to
legitimate, or justify, itself. Exceptions often focus on single cases, such as Peter Ludz' study of regime
legitimation in the former German Democratic Republic, or on the relationship between legitimation
and a particular ideology, most often communism.5 Indeed, beyond suggesting that regimes for whom
legitimation by democratization is not an option possess pressing legitimation challenges, existing
literature gives little attention to the agency of regimes in choosing a legitimation strategy, as a set of
strategic actors with a distinct utility function. Legitimation is instead often understood as influenced
4 Scholars who delve deeply into the question of legitimacy and the individual-level motives behind obedience often
distinguish these two motivations. I accept both, focusing on the common denominator of obeying out of a belief that
obedience is good.
5 Peter Ludz, "Legitimacy in Divided Nation: The Case of the German Democratic Republic," in Bogdan Denitch (ed.),
Legitimation ofRegimes: International Frameworksfor Analysis (London: Sage Publications) 1979. Studies on
Communist regimes' legitimation strategies include Stephen White, "Economic Performance and Communist
Legitimacy," World Politics 38:3 (Apr 1986), and the contributions in T.H. Rigby and Ferenc Feher (ed.), Political
Legitimation in Communist States (New York: St. Martin's Press) 1982.
6 For an overview of literature on legitimation, see Denitch 1979.
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by the demands of the population, in line with the long-standing "pluralist" paradigm of politics. 7 Even
the more modem version of the pluralist paradigm, which abandons its predecessor's "passive and
benign" view of the state, fails to acknowledge that the state can be more than simply reactive to the
population; it "retains [pluralism's] central insight that politics is best described as a process through
which the state responds to the diverse viewpoints and concerns of individual citizens."8 While the
demands of its citizenry indeed influences a regime's legitimation strategy, the state's prerogative for
action as an autonomous, rational actor seeking to ensure its survival is generally undervalued.9 This
paper seeks to contribute to the literature on legitimation strategies not only by illuminating the agency
of regimes in choosing them, which in turn suggests that the choice of justifying argument follows
from the survival threats a regime faces, but also by giving reason to believe that systematic
relationships can be determined between the level of threat to a regime's survival and the argument it
will choose. Indeed, as the next section will discuss, mono-ethnic regimes in multi-ethnic societies
possess a particular need to justify their rule.
mono-ethnic Regimes' Need to Justify: Theoretical Approaches
Survival Challenges for Regimes in Ranked Multi-ethnic Societies
Multi-ethnic states yield unique challenges for ruling mono-ethnic regimes, which appear
through mechanisms of perpetuating salience of ethnicity and infusing ethnic divisions with hostility.
These challenges can be gleaned from the existing literature on multi-ethnic states, specifically from
the (overlapping) literatures on intergroup relations and institutional design in multi-ethnic societies.
7 Popular pluralist works include Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (London: Saunders and Otley) 1835;
Harold Laski, Authority in the Modern State (New Haven: Yale University Press) 1919; and, among more modem
works, Robert Dahl, Polyarchy: Opposition and Participation (New Haven: Yale University Press) 1971.
8 Bruce Gilley, Right to Rule (New York: Columbia University Press) 2009, 61.
9 Gilley, whose work focuses on the sources of legitimacy and foreign-policy implications of a regime's level of it,
corroborates this point.
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The former establishes that the general dominance of one group over another, all else equal, encourages
salience of ethnic identities, which not only increases the need for repression when the dominant group
is a minority but also impedes the successful construction or evocation of a collective identity centered
around the regime. Following on Frederik Barth's discussion of the boundaries between ethnic groups
as constructed, varying, and significant, Michael Banton argued that the level of privilege a group has
vis-a-vis others and the exclusivity of the group together determine the character of other groups in
competition, as well as the overall nature of relations between the various groups.10 He specifically
notes that if an exclusive group in a position of privilege decides to retain the hard boundary between
them and other groups, they are "likely to develop images of themselves and of outsiders that will
justify such policies." Meanwhile, people who feel themselves excluded are "likely to fight back,
organizing to pursue their objectives, and developing an image of themselves which counterbalances
the implication that they are unworthy of belonging to the privileged group," thereby developing a
"group consciousness" around their group."1 In other words, Banton argues that the establishment of a
dominant ethnic "in-group" begets the creation of cohesive "out-groups," thus reinforcing and
perpetuating rigid intergroup boundaries. 12 As a result, ethnicity remains salient, perpetuating the
perception of illegitimacy of any mono-ethnic regime and thereby the challenge to its survival.
Horowitz similarly argues that "ranked" ethnic systems are likely to perpetuate hostility and
division in a multi-ethnic society. The mechanism by which it occurs, he argues, is a sense of self-
worth that derives strongly from perceptions of one's group's self-worth, which is damaged in a ranked
system in which the group is subordinate. Ethnic competition results, because people aspire to belong
'0 Michael Banton, Ethnic and Racial Competition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 1983.
" ibid, 126.
12 This goes to the logic of social identity theory. For a good discussion, see Rupert Brown, "Social Identity Theory: Past
Achievements, Current Problems, and Future Challenges," European Journal ofSocial Psychology 30:6 (Nov 2000).
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to a group with a favorable comparative evaluation. 13 Not only does ethnicity remain salient as a
result, but society is likely to become tense and conflictual as a consequence of enduring salience and
legitimation of the regime is therefore likely to become even harder.
Indeed, regime legitimation is also harder amid domestic instability; the connection between
perpetuated salience of identity and domestic instability is also discussed in the literature on
institutional design in democratizing multi-ethnic societies. This is captured in the debate over the
advantages and disadvantages of a consociational system. Arend Lijphart proposed the system as an
ideal solution for societies with a "deeply fragmented political culture" and where, as a result, stability
is lacking. Lijphart's advocates for consociational systems, which allow for governmental power-
sharing among ethnic groups, on the grounds that they "counteract the immobilizing and unstabilizing
effects of cultural fragmentation." 14 However, such systems are criticized for failing to do just that,
and instead keeping ethnicity salient. Horowitz, Eric Nordlinger, and Benjamin Reilly all question the
merits of consociational systems on the grounds that by indelibly embedding ethnicity into the
government, they encourage ethnic "outbidding" and subsequently reinforce ethnic divisions; this
would not only prove fatal to a democracy but impose significant challenges for an ethnic minority
regime. 15
The literature establishes a solid link between salience of ethnic identity and domestic
instability. In addition, the debate over consociational systems also suggests that embedding ethnicity
into the government perpetuates the salience of ethnic identity, and that on intergroup boundaries also
suggests that generalized dominance of one group over another not only enhances ethnicity's salience
but infuses it with hostility. We should therefore expect that mono-ethnic regimes will face significant
13 Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press) 1985, 146.14 Arend Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy," World Politics 21:2 (Jan 1969), 212.
15 Benjamin Reilly, "Electoral Systems for Divided Societies," Journal ofDemocracy 13:2 (April 2002), 1-3. Also Reilly,
Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Crisis Management (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press) 2001.
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challenges to their rule, as their very existence makes the society over which they rule disunited and
unstable. Moreover, we expect that the degree of challenge to their legitimation stems from the degree
of threat that the disenfranchised, insulted, and hostile excluded groups pose, which is largely
determined by their size relative to the dominant group The greater the threat posed, the greater the
effort required of the dominant group to diminish the salience of ethnicity--and the harder this goal is to
achieve. Indeed, that minority mono-ethnic regimes face tremendous difficulties in consolidating their
rule has been observed by Milne and Kuper, while their particularly conflict-prone nature has been
determined by Cederman and corroborated by Fearon, Kasara, and Laitin. 16
In sum, while all regimes seeking to remain in power might be compelled to craft a justifying
argument to present to its populace, there is theoretical underpinning for the claim that the need is
greater for mono-ethnic regimes in multi-ethnic societies, and indeed that the exigency of it increases
with a decrease in the relative size of the dominant group to the population at large. Moreover, because
the threat to the regime's survival also grows - and becomes more multifaceted -- as the relative size of
the group shrinks, we might find it reasonable to speculate that the relative size of the group drives the
type of justifying argument a regime will choose. We therefore now turn to the possible types of
arguments and their differences.
Tves of Justifying Arguments
With the conceptual similarity of a justifying argument to legitimation, the types of justifying
arguments that a regime might use are informed by studies of legitimacy. Scholars have identified a
16 R.S. Milne, Politics in Ethnically Bipolar States: Fiji, Guyana, Malaysia (Vancouver: University of British Columbia
Press) 1980; Kuper; Lars-Erik Cedarman and Luc Girardin, "Beyond Fractionalization: Mapping Ethnicity onto
Nationalist Insurgencies," American Political Science Review 101 (2007); James Fearon, Kimuli Kasara and David
Laitin, "Ethnic Minority Rule and Civil War Onset," American Political Science Review 101 (2007). It should be noted
that Fearon, Kasara, and Laitin reject Cedarman and Girardin's broader finding, but in doing so note that a small number
of conflict-prone ethnic-minority-regime outliers account for much of the correlation that the latter observe.
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number of different types of legitimacy, each of which can correspond to a different argument a regime
might to elicit regime-reinforcing compliance. Existing literature on legitimacy and legitimation
suggests five key justifying arguments that regimes might logically employ to convince the population
of its right to rule.
In his exposition on legitimacy as allowing for a much stable basis for rule than simple coercion
or co-optation, Max Weber offered a taxonomy of types of legitimacy that remains widely accepted. 17
His three ideal-types - rational-legal, traditionalist, and charismatic legitimacy - suggest a gamut of
justifying arguments. Rational-legal legitimacy, characterized by the presence of universally-
acclaimed institutions, justifies rule by virtue of its "legality"; it is "domination as exercised by the
'modem servant of the state and all those bearers of power who in this respect resemble him."' 18 In
short, the regime justifies itself with the argument that its rule is embedded in formally circumscribed
powers. Traditionalist legitimacy, on the other hand, is characterized by rule on the basis of historical
precedent for such a regime, entailing a process of identification among the population. The underlying
justifying argument claims that the regime is justified because it is embedded in a culture that is shared
with its people. Weber's third ideal-type, charismatic legitimacy, justifies rule based on the inherent
beneficence of a particular leader or institution. The justifying argument inherent in this type of
legitimacy is just that-the apotheosis of the specific leader or institution.
This typology of legitimacy suggests three types of arguments a regime might use to explain or
justify its rule. The first is an argument based on the presence of widely-accepted legal, which is to say
democratic, institutions; I will call this a democratic-institutional argument. Second is an argument
emphasizing a common identity uniting the regime and its entire population, which I will call
17 Max Weber, Economy and Society (Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, ed.; Berkeley: University of California Press)
1978.
18 Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 1958,
79.
D. Berman -- 10
identificational arguments. The final argument, suggested by charismatic legitimacy, is based on the
inherently good and even deific nature of a particular leader or institution. It generally entails a so-
called "cult of personality" and is propagated in a broad propaganda scheme. Because a charismatic
argument is unlikely to be articulated in the speeches of the seniormost leader, which this study
evaluates as the source for justifying arguments, this type of argument will not be dealt with in this
paper. It should, however, be considered in further study.
One more potential argument merits discussion. A significant addendum to Weber's typology of
legitimacy comes from Seymour Lipset, consisting in justification for rule based on the regime's
apparent success-- "performance legitimacy". 19 As Stephen White and Rigby and Feher contend, this
type of legitimacy was sought by communist regimes, who intended to justify their rule by means of
validating their economically-oriented ideology with successful economic performance.20 I call the
justifying argument suggested by this type of legitimacy economic-social developmental.
Benefits, Disadvantages of Different Arguments for mono-ethnic Regimes-Why Expect
Variation?
These three types of justifying arguments - democratic-institutional, identificational, and
economic-social developmental - differ in two key ways, giving us reason to expect variation with the
degree of dominance of the ruling regime's ethnic group in the population. The first difference lies in
the mechanisms and degree of accountability the different arguments inflict upon the regime, which
will logically vary with the degree and mechanisms of accountability that a regime can tolerate-a
product of its group's dominance in society. In short, the justifying argument that a regime makes
19 Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy,"
American Political Science Review 53:1 (March 1959).
20 White; T.H Rigby and Ferenc Feher (ed.), Political Legitimation in Communist States (New York: Palgrave Macmillan)
1982. A particular legitimation strategy discussed more in international relations literature than the comparative
literature, nationalistic prestige-seeking, can be considered subsumed under performance legitimacy.
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suggests the primary criterion by which it desires to be evaluated. That is to say, a democratic-
institutional justifying argument, being rooted in the presence of democratic institutions and the rule of
law, leaves the regime vulnerable to popular censure for if it is seen to comport itself disapprovingly.
Even if the laws and institutions so lauded have limited power in practice, their presence and indeed
emphasis by the regime suggests such accountability to the public, raising the public's expectation of
its effective existence. Therefore, we might expect that the less secure its group's rule - the higher its
dominance in the population at large - the less likely a regime is to make a democratic-institutional
argument, because it becomes increasingly threatened by the democratic process (as discussed in
section 1) and is therefore less likely to want to open itself up to criticism for not following through
with potentially self-immolating behavior.
By justifying its rule based on economic and social successes, a regime justifying itself with an
economic-social developmental argument makes itself vulnerable to backlash in the event that such
successes end, even as a result of exogenous factors. Therefore, even though this argument does not
explicate a mechanism for regime accountability, in communicating to the populace that it perceives its
capability to advance development as its raison d'etre, it provides an a priori justification for its
removal from power. Consequently, as with democratic-institutional arguments, we can expect a
regime to be less likely to make itself vulnerable in this way the more vulnerable, and thus lower, its
overall dominance in society is.
Identificational justifying arguments, which can be subcategorized into arguments evoking
national, religious, and supranational identities, differ from the above two arguments in that they
provide neither a mechanism nor a concrete logic of accountability. By suggesting to the population
that it should be evaluated based on its support for national, religious, or transnational causes,
The degree and mechanism of accountability they provide is just one of the differences among
the three justifying arguments discussed; the second difference between them is their potential for
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marginalizing ethnicity as a salient identity in society. As discussed above, this is imperative for mono-
ethnic regimes in multi-ethnic states, the more so the lower the dominance of the ruling group in the
state's total population. Of the three arguments, only identificational has potential to reduce the
salience of ethnic identity, by increasing the salience of another, all-encompassing identity over it. We
might therefore expect that while democratic-institutional and economic-social developmental
arguments increase in likelihood as the ruling group's dominance increases, identificational arguments
increase in likelihood as the group's dominance decreases.
We can therefore distill the following hypothesis regarding the relationship between a ruling
group's dominance in the population at large and the justifying argument it will employ:
HI: Democratic-institutional arguments will decrease in likelihood as dominance
decreases.
H2: Economic-social developmental arguments will decrease in likelihood as
dominance decreases.
H3: Identificational arguments will increase in likelihood as dominance increases.
The chart below summarizes the predictions and mechanisms driving them.
Table 1.
% Dominance Ability to Tolerate Need to Reduce Dominant Argument
Accountability Salience of Ethnicity
90% highest lowest Dem-Inst
80% -- ~~ Dem-Inst/Econ-Soc
70% Dem-Inst/Econ-Soc
60% Econ-Soc





10% lowest highest Ident'l
This chart merits a few notes. First, the arguments are not all evenly distributed over
percentages. Because of the fundamental illegitimacy of minority regimes, I expect that once
dominance diminishes beyond effective bipolarity, presumably comprising less than 40-50% of the
population, their ability to tolerate any accountability plummets and their need to reduce the salience of
ethnicity soars.
The second note is that this presumes an effectively bi-ethnic society - that is, one in which
90% dominance means a single 10% minority group. If we do away with the assumption of a single
unified minority (that is, non-dominant group), the predictions theoretically change a bit because the
mechanisms operate differently. Let us consider each mechanism separately. The first, the threat
accountability poses to a regime and the regime's subsequent ability to tolerate it, is altered in an
obvious way: the divided nature of the subordinate sector of the population makes accountability
harder to impose on a regime, thus reducing the threat of accountability and increasing the regime's
ability to tolerate it.
The second mechanism, the threat posed by ethnicity being salient and subsequent need to
deflect attention from ethnic identity, changes in a more complex way. Here, the main agent for change
is the uncertainty added into the equation: a regime whose ruling group has 80% dominance over two
10% minority groups has equal theoretical potential to remain 80:20 or become 90:10, depending on
with whom the separate minority groups decide to cast in their lot (and assuming, as I shall consistently
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do in this section, that the ruling group remains cohesive and at least one group will always remain
unaligned with the ruling group). Moreover, 40% dominance over two 30% groups is a potential
70:30, and 20% dominance over two 40% groups is potentially 60:40. 30% dominance over seven
10% minorities is potentially anywhere from 40:60 to 90:10, but because the efforts required to achieve
higher dominance increases with the number of groups for which allegiance must be elicited, the
likelihood of attaining higher dominance decreases beyond 40:60. Overall, to consider how the
predicted justifying arguments might change, we focus on the amount of uncertainty in the ruling
group's dominance, figured as the difference between its current relative dominance and the relative
dominance it could feasibly attain by attaining the allegiance of one additional group. We can make the
following observations:
1. The higher dominance of the ruling group, and consequently the smaller the subordinate
component of the population, the less uncertainty in the group's dominance.
2. The lower dominance of the group, and consequently the larger the subordinate component
of the population, the more uncertainty in the group's dominance.
If we then recall the theoretical grounding for assuming a steep dropoff in ability to tolerate
accountability and upsurge in need to deflect from ethnicity when a regime loses numerical dominance
and becomes minority-ruled, we can therefore make the following assumption: the lower the ruling
group's dominance and consequently the higher its uncertainty, which is to say the more its dominance
stands to increase and the greater the benefit the regime would derive from the increase, the greater the
regime's incentives to reduce the salience of ethnicity. We might therefore expect a regime's need to
reduce ethnicity to increase exponentially instead of linearly as the ruling group's dominance decreases
among multiple groups.
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II. Methodology
I contend that the argument a mono-ethnic regime in a multi-ethnic regime makes for its
exclusive hold on power should vary with its dominance in the population. To test this, I analyze the
speeches of senior leaders in eight states. For the sake of consistency I evaluate states in which the
groups involved - and the dominant group - are the same, and that allow to control for regional effects.
The states, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq (under Saddam Hussein), Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab
Emirates, and Yemen, are all Sunni-dominated regimes in states whose populations are generally bi-
ethnic, featuring cohesive Sunni and Shi'ite components as their only significant minority groups.
Indeed, the presence of nearby Shi'ite Iran with a history of impelling neighboring Shi'ites to anti-
governmental action ensures that Sunni regimes are wary of their varying Shi'ite populations. And,
importantly for our purposes, the degree of dominance of the ruling Sunnis in the population varies
significantly across states. I hypothesize that as the degree of dominance changes across countries, the
rhetoric will systematically vary in the extent to which it draws attention to its grounding in a system of
universally lauded institutions, emphasizes economic and social developmental successes, and evokes a
common religious, ideological, or pan-Arab identity. The number of national identity evocations are
also evaluated, but because of the potentially divisive nature of national identity in multi-ethnic states
they are considered as they compare to number of identificational evocations rather than as a distinct
identificational argument.
There is a small body of literature corroborating this idea of rhetoric as a political tool that
merits brief discussion. The basic literature discussing the formation of rhetoric in politics merits a
brief discussion. The idea that political leaders have some degree of power to shape the worldview of
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their constituents with their use of language was first substantively explored by Walter Lipmann, who
argued that leaders of a government control public opinion by synthesizing, simplifying, and
dichotomizing complex issues into stereotypes. Facilitated by the fact that the real environment is
"altogether too big, too complex, and too fleeting for direct acquaintance," 21 Lipmann's leaders
deliberately construct these "pseudo-environments" of stereotypes out of the belief that shaping public
opinion allows one to shape public behavior. Murray Edelman advances this idea that leaders use
symbolic language to manipulate the public for their own ends. 23 These seminal works develop the
idea that language is used as a political tool. Other works on rhetoric take these two pieces as their
starting point, generally consisting of broad theoretical discussions or single-country case studies.
As noted, this project seeks to capture regime's justifying arguments. Considering the
established utility of rhetoric as a political tool, it is reasonable to expect that senior leaders' annual
public speeches, the focus for this project, would also serve as an opportunity for the regime to
reinforce its rule by reiterating its justifying argument. As such, to test the hypothesis that a regime's
justifying argument will vary systematically with the ruling ethnic group's dominance in the
population, I perform content analysis on speeches from the most senior leader in each country, usually
the King or Emir, given on a particular annual occasion when the leaders would be expected to defend
their rule. I chose speeches given on one particular holiday, the state's National Day, pursuant to the
latter logic as well as to maximize consistency across countries, since many leaders indeed spoke on
21 Walter Lipmann, Public Opinion (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co.) 1922. p. 17.
22 ibid. p. 31.
23 Murray Edelman, Symbolic Uses ofPolitics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press) 1964.
24 See, for example, Stephen Walker, "National Role Conceptions and Systemic Outcomes," in L. Falkowski (ed.),
Psychological Models in International Politics (Boulder, CO: Westview Press) 1979; Cloaked in Virtue: Unveiling Leo
Strauss and the Rhetoric ofAmerican Foreign Policy (New York: Routledge) 2008; Jeffrey Tulis, The Rhetorical
Presidency (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press) 1987; B. Thomas Trout, "Political Legitimation and the Cold
War," International Studies Quarterly 19 (September 1975); George Kateb, "The Novelty of the Iraq War," The Good
Society 16:2 (2007); Xing Lu and Herbert Simons, "Transitional Rhetoric of Chinese Communist Party Leaders in the
Post-Mao Reform Period: Dilemmas and Strategies," Quarterly Journal of Speech 92:3 (August 2006); "Eradicating the
"Little Satan": Why Iran Should Be Taken at Its Word," Commentary 127:1 (January 2007).
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National Day. In cases where the senior did not give an annual speech on National Day, his (widely
circulated) annual speeches to Parliament were used. I sought 5-10 annual speeches for each leader to
minimize the effects on rhetoric, admittedly an overdetermined phenomenon, of exogenous shocks
such as a war, an election, or an economic crisis that might reasonably be expected to influence a
speech's content. The most recent speeches available for each regime were used.
Each speech was analyzed for the presence of an array of code words associated with a
particular argument; the economic-social developmental argument was assessed by the number of
successes or specific programs the leader identified. I then calculated the percent of total evocations
that each particular argument comprised for the identificational and democratic-institutional, while
development successes were calculated as a percent of the total word count of a speech. I then
averaged all the percentages for each category in the total set of speeches for that country, which was
used in the cross-country comparison. The goal is to establish a correlation between variations in level
of dominance and variation in the frequency of keywords for each argument, to determine which (non-
mutually-exclusive) arguments feature most prominently in a regime's justification for its rule. To
alleviate the challenges for comparison that the difference in unit of measurement between the
economic-social developmental and evocational arguments creates, a country's value for each argument
will be considered for its ranking among the countries evaluated.
III. Findin2s
As the following graphs demonstrate, there appears to be some evidence for shifts in rhetoric
correlating with shifts in degree of Sunni dominance. While a relationship between pan-Arab and
democratic-institutional evocations appears elusive, social-economic development and national identity
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evocations indeed respectively decrease and increase with an increase in Sunni dominance. The
national identity relationship becomes stronger (r2 = 0.71) if we drop Bahrain on account of its
exceptional circumstances and the development relationship becomes stronger (r2 = 0.88) if we drop
the equally low-scoring Egypt and Jordan on account of their effective homogeneity (% Sunni'> 90), as
will be discussed later. Although there appears to be no relationship between dominance and total
identity evocations, a summation of the religious, ideological, and pan-Arab, some relationship appears
to exist between dominance and religious evocations, with the latter increasing as the former decreases.
Moreover, despite the absence of a linear relationship, what we can infer from the total identity
evocation graph is that identity evocations become important when dominance is very low. This is
indeed what we would expect. The results are presented in tabular and graphical format below. It
should be noted that because ideological evocations only exist in the case of Iraq, they will not be
considered in the analysis except in that one case. Moreover, total evocations as an average percentage
of full text is also not treated, as it was intended merely to corroborate the assumption of consistency
(which it appears to do). All values are the averages for a speech in that country.
Table 2.
Bahrain Egypt Iraq Jordan Kuwait Qatar UAE Yemen
% Sunni 30 90 35 92 60 86 80 63
Dominance
# Speeches 3 4 5 6 4 11 6 7
National* 56.1 68.55 20.52 56.77 52 47.91 64.47 47.3
Religious* 22.13 14.04 41.44 14.25 33.68 13.71 10.65 12.59
Ideological* 0 0 1.86 0 0 0 0 0
Pan-Arab* 8.9 12.9 36.24 14.55 0.73 25.54 16.32 19.54
Econ-Soc* 4.93 11.5 0.95 6.53 10.3 41.9 33.6 18.96
Dem-Inst'l* 12.03 4.53 0 13.67 13.63 12.69 8.57 20.64
Total 31.03 26.93 79.54 28.8 34.4 39.25 26.97 32.13
Identificat'l
Evocations**
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58.33 63.25 218.2
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Pan-Arab Evocations
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The findings from this content analysis will now be examined in context, with case studies of
Iraq under Saddam Hussein, Yemen, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain.
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IV: Case Study 1: Iraq, 1968-2003
Occasion for speeches: National Day ("Revolution Day," the anniversary of the Ba'thist Revolution)
Saddam Hussein's Sunni regime represents a scant 35% of the mostly Shi'ite population, a
pattern of dominance established by the British during their rule over Iraq in the 1920s under a League
of Nations mandate. As a minority regime, Saddam Hussein's government had the challenge of
attaining compliance from a general population in which it lacked any dominance at all without
actually enabling the disenfranchised and discontented Shi'ites to threaten the regime's rule. Indeed,
the Shi'ite population of Iraq had shown itself cohesive and restive over its peripheral lot since the first
coup attempt by the predominantly-Sunni Ba'thists in 1963, with its resistance ultimately providing the
key obstacle to the coup's success. 26 As early as 1969 the regime began a campaign of "harassment" of
the Shi'ite hierarchy; it has been observed of the regime in the early 1970s that "the capacity of certain
Shi'ite figures to command respect and to exercise authority within the community clearly unnerved a
regime based on narrow circles emanating from the Sunni lands of the northwest."27 This view was
inevitably reinforced by the sporadic continuation of Shi'ite protests of various impact throughout
Saddam Hussein's tenure.
I argue that the relative size of the mono-ethnic regime's group in a multi-ethnic society drives
the argument the regime will use to justify its rule to the population, determining whether the rulers
will predominantly rely on democratic-institutional (the regime merits perpetuation because it
possesses and is embedded in a system of universally acclaimed democratic institutions), economic-
social developmental (the regime merits perpetuation because it has brought developmental success to
25 For a discussion of British rule in Iraq see Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)
2000, and Adeed Dawisha, Iraq : A Political History from Independence to Occupation (Princeton: Princeton
University Press) 2009.
26 Yitzhak Nakash, The Shi'is oflraq (Princeton: Princeton University Press) 1994, ch. 4.
27 Tripp, 201-204.
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the country and its inhabitants), or identificational (the regime merits perpetuation because it is acts in
the best interest of an identity in which it shares) arguments. Democratic-institutional arguments offer
the most concrete and broad-ranging mechanisms of accountability for the regime, economic-social
developmental less so, and identificational arguments the least, providing the least explicit rubric with
which it desires to be evaluated. The various arguments' potential to detract from the ethnic nature of
the regime, vitiating inevitable intergroup tensions where one group exclusively dominates another and
thus reducing the threat to the regime' perpetuation, increases along the same pattern, being lowest with
democratic-institutional and highest with identificational arguments. Since a regime exclusively
populated by a minority group is the most threatened by public accountability and has the greatest need
to detract from the regime's ethnic nature, I expect such a regime to adopt an identificational justifying
argument. An analysis of speeches by longtime Iraqi President Saddam Hussein should demonstrate as
much, showing few economic-social developmental evocations and even fewer democratic-institutional
but a high number of identificational evocations.
The data reveals that Iraq's values for democratic-institutional and economic-social
developmental arguments are zero and 0.95, respectively; a cross-country comparison shows that these
are the lowest values for each argument. However, not only does Iraq have by far the highest value for
identificational arguments overall, but it outranks every other country for all three composite non-
national identities. (religious = 41.44, ideological = 1.86, pan-Arab = 36.24). The emphasis on trans-
and supranational identities appear to come at the expense of national identity, which has by far the
lowest value of all countries studied (20.52).
As noted, there is not a single evocation of a democratic-institutional argument. Indeed,
Saddam's speeches do not even approach suggesting concrete measures of accountability, often
straying toward abstract moralizing in general. There are even very few references to economic-social
developmental successes, actual or potential, save for the occasional vague reference to potential
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economic benefits from tightening pan-Arab relations ("[increased cooperation] has activated the
economic markets" and "[as a result] products will grow both quantitatively and qualitatively") (Iraq
1999). The only other exception in the speeches evaluated is a short paragraph in which purported
achievements are cited in a series of short rhetorical questions: "Shall we say that a great number of
our Iraqi people were barefooted, and only a few of them thought that their life would be better the next
day? Should we compare the number and the level of students in schools now and before? Should we
talk about what we used to manufacture and how and what we used to import, from which countries
and how? Or should we count down the number of workers in the countryside, and in the industrial
and services sectors compared to their numbers now despite the unjust blockade? (Iraq 2001)" Not
only does the rhetorical-question format seek to avoid initiating discussion on these points - Saddam
actually follows up this list of questions with a dismissive "no, I will not burden you with these details"
- but he ends the above list with what can only be read as an excuse for any present or future less-than-
impressive development: "Should we mention the high level of the standard of living of the Iraqis
prior to the buildup of the forces of the evil and the mobilization of their fire against Iraq in a timing
and a way that made them think that they would indubitably destroy Iraq, its people, inspirations, role,
and destiny?!" This approach, suggesting of the existence of "figures and achievements" quantifying
the revolutionary regime's successes but assuring that he thoughtfully "will not bother [the audience]
with them" is a regular feature of Saddam's speeches (this wording from Iraq 1998).
Moreover, Saddam regularly glorifies suffering caused by the absence of economic and social
development for the sake of his regime's revolutionary causes. Discussing the international embargo
against Iraq, he proclaims:
If the enemies of Iraq imagine that they are able to deceive a people mobilized with all
the factors of national zeal and the experiences of life it has experienced, ... a people that
made tens of thousands of generous sacrifices of valuable lives every short period of
time as a result of the shortage of food and medicine and due to the use of force, we say
to them, in the name of the great people of Iraq, that they are wrong and it is better for
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them to reread the ancient history and this glorious history carefully in order to derive
the lessons that distance us from them from the abyss of their evils and their souls
inciting them to evil (Iraq 1998).
In another case, he accepts that suffering may be the lot of the faithful in a prayer to God: "Oh Allah,
(...) to You we bow in worship, capable in victory, hailing Your Will, grateful for the blessings You
bestow upon us in this instance or in others, or wherever our feet are made to bleed by the blades,
spikes and edges of the road, we will not change in this and in other endeavours.." Instead, he
proclaims the revolution that ushered him into power as supremely good, but limits the discussion of its
benefit to the sublime and metaphysical - in short, to phenomena that cannot be seen as a rubric against
which his regime can be evaluated. A common theme is that the revolution serves the greater benefit of
mankind, and suffering in its name is therefore going to that end: "The sacrifices offered along [the
revolution's] course are not only for the sake of Iraq, but also for the sake of our glorious Arab Nation
as long as the Revolution remains national and for the whole Nation as it is for Iraq, as it is for
humanity in general (Iraq 1999)." Elsewhere he describes the lofty benefits of the revolution:
[The revolution] is a state of evolution and ascent towards what is deemed to be almost
impossible. (...) What I am referring to is its spirit, its ability to guide life and renew it
along the best path there is. And I am referring to the intent of faith in the hearts of the
men who caused the noble fount to gush out and who mustered up all the potencies in
the hearts and minds of the people so that they may plant all that is useful and healthy in
the womb of life. The July Revolution has not been a traditional course taken with the
intention of weaving for the people an overall to cover blemishes that show through
their tattered dress. It has been the sowing of healthy seeds where they should be sown
before irrigating them with the water of life so that they grow green and blooming and
fruitful. Its yield of fruit will spread the zeal rendered in sowing the healthy seeds. It
will thus spread and extend the cultivation of life to a vast homeland (...) (Iraq 2000).
Saddam's articulation of the benefits the revolution brought to Iraq is similarly sublime and allegorical:
Before the July Revolution, the condition in Iraq can be described as follows: It was a
wasteland that had no agriculture to be taken into account and no livestock to be proud
of although it had much water. Is it possible that life and land suffer from thirst while
water exists?
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The Iraqis knew that they had the potential, but they did not know how to muster up that
potential. Their rulers did not take the responsibility on the basis of that potential. The
leader and the guide who was able to put that potential on its right course had not yet
emerged from among them. Even when some had discovered that potential, they did not
know how to deal with it. Nor did they direct it where it should be directed so as to
enable it to evolve into an effective act that could make life pulsate and fill hearts with
happiness.
Each thing and each element in Iraq then stood isolated in its properties and
characteristics from other things and elements. No reaction between them took place,
since that reaction required first the presence of a catalyst to enable the principal
elements to release the sparks of life. Their reaction would have purged souls, revived
zeal, removed the veil from eyes and hearts and sent life flowing into its limbs that had
gone dry and paralyzed.
That was how Iraq was then.
But a breeze blew on it. It was like indignation voiced by a gentle patient man. It was
like the smile of a baby whispering to its mother, or playing with itself in celebration of
life. It was like a prayer of a hermit giving God the adoration of great love. That breeze
dipped out of the Great Sea of Omnipotence, after the Great Master of Omnipotence, the
Merciful, the Compassionate had permitted that.
And there was rain!
It was clement rain, filling the sky of Iraq and falling abundantly on its parched land.
The idle wells filed their beds and water overflowed all around. The immortal Tigris
brimmed and so did the Euphrates. The main flow filled its tributaries. Life crept into
every living thing and every dead thing was removed from the field. Together with that
relieving rain, there blew pollinating winds. They speeded [sic] up the shaking of the
date-palm trunks. Pollen was strewn over the heads of palm trees. Similar pollen was
sent to every tree and every plant.
And there was life (Iraq 2000)!
Saddam Hussein clearly does not want his population to judge his right to rule based on the presence of
either democratic institutions or economic and social development.
Instead, Saddam Hussein's speeches are replete with identificational evocations. The category
of ideological identifications, evoking a political ideology, only has a non-zero value for Iraq. The
particular ideology that is referenced, Ba'thism, is a socialist political ideology that is pan-Aran in root
and has historically been used to martial nationalist sentiment, not unlike European national-socialist
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parties. Although Saddam's speeches do occasionally reference Ba'thism, in which his rule is
nominally couched, the total focus on ideological identity is low, amounting to only 1.86% of all
evocations. Rather, Saddam's predominant emphasis is on the supranational identities, with religious
and pan-Arab identities respectively comprising 44.44% and 36.24% of the total number of evocations.
Many of the religious identity references consist of glorifications of God and historical religious
figures, with frequent references to Iraq as the land of Abraham and thus the Iraqis as favored people
(Iraq 1999 and 2000, e.g.). Benedictions are not uncommon, though: in one speech, nearly one-fourth
is an extended prayer (Iraq 2002).
An examination of the context in which religious evocations appear suggests that such
evocations can serve two different, if not entirely independent, functions. In addition to providing
common ground around which both ruling Sunnis and majority Shi'ites can coalesce under the ruling
regime, such an emphasis on God and His will has the effect of deemphasizing the regime's
responsibility for the country's well-being, consequently avoiding any suggestion of the regime's
accountability. Many of the religious epithets in Saddam's speeches appear as assigning God
responsibility for events, either in the past or the future. The phrase "God willing" is a frequent feature
of all of his speeches. It even appears twice in one paragraph in one case: "This year and the
subsequent additional time will be the year and time, God willing, of the serious erosion of the
embargo on Iraq. They will be, with the assets of the revolutionary, patriotic and faithful energy as
well as the genuine national position of those who take it, the stock of the aquiver and the fountain of
the great waterfall to conquer the embargo, break its restrictions, dishonor its masters, the evil and vile.
God willing (Iraq 1998)." 28 Elsewhere he argues, "Whenever your revolution has fallen short in any
aspect which you might have wished to see happen otherwise, then its excuse is the fact that it has been
true to its objectives; and success comes only from Allah (Iraq 2002)." Similarly, Saddam explicitly
28 emphasis added.
D. Berman -- 29
assigns responsibility to God for his people's comfort and well-being in an extended benediction:
Our Allah, our Creator; and Creator of the Heavens which You lifted without pillars;
Creator of the earth which You stretched and tied to the strings of Your Will. (...) We
accept your decision when you make what is difficult easy and reachable, or when you
delay, in your own wisdom, our victory in the field, or the fruit of our effort and
struggle, thus making our feet bleed due to the difficulties and sacrifices of the road. The
hearts may be affected by time to the extent, and in the manner that You choose; but our
conscience will remain strong and rich in the faith. We appeal to You to keep our hearts
rich with comfort and content, and preserve our Iman and worship as the healing
compassion in our hearts, which are most precious, as well as in every good deed which
meets with Your satisfaction (Iraq 2002).
Though not properly an instance of an identificational argument because it serves more to reduce the
accountability of the regime by deflecting blame for past, present or future misfortune from it, such
religious evocations indicate the regime's inability to tolerate accountability and, by redirecting
responsibility for misfortune away from the regime, reinforce its hold on power.
That said, Saddam's speeches also incorporate religious evocations that do appear to call
forward a Muslim identity among his people. The glorification of religious figures and reference to
Iraq in a biblical context, as described above, demonstrates as much, as do frequent mentions of
religious concepts such as jihad (holy war). Arabs and specifically Iraqis are a "people ofjihad (Iraq
1999);" as Saddam declares: "We all face the plight of the embargo, threats, conspiracy and the
courses of evil coming from outside Iraq. We, all, live up to the honor of firmness, position and the
ability to face the threats, relying on God, the Almighty, more confident of the relentless enthusiasm,
which cannot be severed from its fountain and resort, of a great people of Jihad (Iraq 1998)." Beyond
mentions of jihad, Saddam also advocates actions as being a "sacred religious duty (Iraq 1998)" and
emphasizes that Iraq "is not only known for its civilization and humanitarian role, but also as a nation
of prophets and messengers from which God had chosen them and selected it to be a cradle and
historical depth for them and for their role (...) (Iraq 1999)." This use of religion to evoke a common
purpose and destiny among his people promotes unity among Saddam's divided populace; thus we see
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that the religious evocations in Saddam's speeches serve not only to deflect responsibility from the
regime and therefore reduce the burden of accountability that it cannot tolerate, but also to reduce the
salience of ethnicity by evoking an identity shared among the population as a whole as well as the
regime.
The same holds for Saddam's tendency to evoke a pan-Arab identity. While for most leaders
that this project evaluates the evocation of pan-Arab identity largely consists in the articulation of
support for Palestine and opposition to Israel, in addition to their positions on other key pan-Arab
issues, Saddam appears to try to affect a supplanting of the population's national identity with its
common Arab identity. One key indicator of this is the prevalence of pan-Arab evocations compared to
national identity evocations (20.52, the lowest value across countries). Another indicator is that
Saddam pointedly and consistently uses the word nation, commonly used in reference to the country in
all other leaders' speeches, to refer to the Arab people. For example, when he tells his people "you are
part of a great nation (Iraq 2001 and passim)," he makes it crystal clear in context that he is referring to
the Arab nation. This is particularly noteworthy if viewed alongside his tendency to address his
audience as "fellow Arabs" or "Arab brethren," rather than the "countrymen," "citizens," or simply
"brothers" favored by his counterparts in the other countries surveyed.
Saddam's interest in inspiring unity in the population by means of evoking a shared identity is
reinforced by his tendency to dichotomize between sharers in the Arab identity and "others." Pan-Arab
evocations go hand in hand with denigrations of America - Saddam refers to the White House as the
"Black House" (Iraq 1999), and America as "the enemy of peoples in the world" (Iraq 2001) - and what
Saddam deigns only to call the "Zionist entity" (passim). More broadly, his speeches are pervaded by
an us-or-them approach, with frequent references to enemies, good versus evil, and God versus the
devil. Indeed, his speeches are the only ones of the leaders surveyed that include the words "enemy,"
"evil," and "devil." He cites the "evil, covetous tyrant" is "the enemy of Allah (Iraq 2002)," avows that
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"God is with you and no one but the devil will be with your enemies (Iraq 2001)," and generally
follows commendations of the good with moralizing denigrations of the opposite. Of particular
significance is his signature closing for all his speeches: "Long live our glorious Arab Nation / Long
live Iraq / Long live Iraq / Long live Palestine, free and Arab / God is most great / God is most great /
Shame be on the despicable."29 In addition, as noted above, Saddam's us-versus-them identificational
argument is enriched by frequent advocations of jihad. Not only does he advocate jihad against Iraq's
current enemies, but he identifies long periods of jihad in Iraq's history, with one such period being the
Ba'th revolution that ushered his regime into power (e.g., the revolution as a "long march of jihad (Iraq
1998)").
By encouraging an "us versus them" perspective among the population, Saddam encourages
unity of the ethnically divided "us" and justifies his own regime as embedded in, and a defender of, the
"us" against the "them." Moreover, the presence of an opposing "them" permits the regime to deflect
blame for a subpar performance. For example, Saddam exhorts his audience to action in support of
pan-Arab causes on the grounds that "otherwise, the enemies of the Arab nation will inflict more
injustice and tyranny upon you (Iraq 2001)," relegating blame for the sufferings of injustice and
tyranny to these hostile "others." In short, not only does an identificational argument allow a leader to
deflect attention away from accountability, but it detracts from the ethnic nature of his regime and thus
vitiates the threats to his minority regime deriving from it.
Implications
A content analysis of Saddam Hussein's speeches suggests that Saddam's regime adopted an
identificational argument to justify its rule to its population. The large number of pan-Arab evocations,
29 Emphasis added.
D. Berman -- 32
substantiated in context, indicates a specifically pan-Arab identificational argument. Because a
contextual analysis reveals a large number of the highly present religious evocations to function more
as deflection of blame from the regime than necessarily evoking an identity - although a significant
number of religious-identity evocations are present as well - we will call Saddam Hussein's argument
predominantly pan-Arab identificational. Having established that, we now turn to the question of
whether and to what degree this argument can be expected to have influenced its policy.
While an identificational justifying argument allows the regime a freer hand than a democratic-
institutional or economic-social developmental on account of the few mechanisms for accountability
that it suggests, it can still be expected to influence policies in some areas. In general, since Saddam's
regime justifies itself with an identificational argument, we would expect him to have to exert a great
deal of effort to keep the particular identities around which his argument centers, his population's
Muslim and especially Arab identities, salient.
Saddam's Arab and Muslim Policies
Saddam Hussein's policies tended to be characterized by their pan-Arab orientation, reinforcing
this study's conclusion that he justified his regime's rule with an identificational argument focused on
his population's Muslim and particularly Arab (which incorporates the latter) identities. It is
noteworthy that the policies he wants to emphasize - the only policies he mentions in his speeches -
are those focused on strengthening pan-Arab unity. More than half of one speech consists of the
policies Iraq has historically pursued to advance Arab unity (Iraq 1998). However, having
communicated to the population that his right to rule stems from his ability to further pan-Arab
interests, the security of Saddam's regime was heavily influenced by his ability to keep Arab interests
salient and act in their support. This became difficult when domestic interest in an Arab identity began
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to decline, and when Saddam found Arab interests clashing with national interests and the exigencies of
his regime.
The decline in interest in pan-Arabism among the Iraqi population has been hypothesized as
initiated by Iraq's loss in the Iran-Iraq War, with Saddam having abused it as a rallying cry to keep the
majority Shi'ites in the Iraqi population, who are Arabs, from supporting the Persian Shi'ite regime in
Iran.30 Iraq's 1990 invasion of fellow Arab country Kuwait further reduced the potential utility to the
regime of invoking an Arab identity among the population.31 That the majority of the Arab world
responded angrily to the invasion and supported the U.S.-led coalition against it certainly did not help.
According to most accounts, Saddam undertook the invasion as a way to flout what he perceived as
both domestic and international efforts to destabilize his rule; he expected that conquest would be
quick, easy, and justifiable to the Iraqi people as a "liberation."32 With these conditions in mind
Saddam sought to reorient his emphasis to favor Iraqis' Islamic identity instead of Arab, but the hostile
response of the Muslim Arab world similarly diminished this identity's potency for the regime. 33
By demonstrating that his regime was clearly not working in the interest of the population as
Arab and Muslim people, in accordance with the argument with which he justified his rule, Saddam's
initiation (and subsequent loss) of the Gulf War dealt a devastating blow to his rule. 1991 saw serious
revolts among both Shi'ites and Sunnis, including Saddam's own tribesmen. Afterward Saddam found
himself forced to change his emphasis to tribal identities, relying heavily on co-optation and effectively
30 For a more detailed discusion see Adeed Dawisha, Iraq: A Political Historyfrom Independence to Occupation
(Princeton: Princeton University Press) 2009, pp. 235-36.
31 Discussed in Adeed Dawisha, "'Identity' and Political Survival in Saddam's Iraq," Middle East Journal 53:4 (Autumn
1999). See also Malik Mufti, Sovereign Creations : Pan-Arabism and Political order in Syria and Iraq (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press) 1996; F. Gregory Gause, III, "Iraq's Decisions to Go to War, 1980 and 1990," Middle East Journal
56:1 (Winter 2002).
32 F. Gregory Gause, III, "Iraq's Decisions to Go to War, 1980 and 1990," Middle East Journal 56:1 (Winter 2002); Efraim
Karsh and Inari Rautsi, "Why Saddam Hussein Invaded Kuwait," Survival, 33:1(1991).
33 Dawisha 2009.
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decentralizing the regime. His regime never regained its former stature or resilience. 34
The case of Iraq illustrates the implications of adopting an identificational argument to justify a
regime. Saddam found himself limited by the strong need to appear as acting primarily in the interest
of the supranational identities he had emphasized, ultimately having to prioritize supranational interest
over the immediate interests of his regime - or to call into question the very grounds on which his
regime was justified.
3 Discussed in detail in Dawisha 1999 and 2009; Amtatzia Baram, Building Toward Crisis (Washington DC: Washington
Institute of Near East Policy) 1998; Faleh Jabar, "Detribalization and Retribalization in Iraq 1968-1998," Middle East
Journal 215 (Summer 2000).
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V. Case Study 2: Yemen, 1999-Present
Occasion for Annual Speech: National Day (anniversary of unification of Yemeni Arab Republic and
South Yemen)
Yemen is governed by a Sunni regime representing approximately 63% of the population, the
vast majority of the remainder (36%) is Shi'ite. Since the unification of the Yemen Arab Republic and
South Yemen in 1994 the country has been formally a presidential republic, led by President Ali
Abdullah Saleh. He has held the office since 1978 as President of the Yemen Arab Republic, being
reelected in the unified country in 1999 and 2006. Since unification, the Saleh regime has contended
with a troublesome Shi'ite rebellion in the north that it suspects is financed by Iran, as well as a restive
troupe of Sunnis favoring secession in the south. The challenge for his regime, then, is to protect his
power against sectarian threats to his regime and secessionist threats from largely co-ethnic South
Yemenis.
Here I contend that the argument that a mono-ethnic regime will use to justify its rule to the
population will depend on the relative size of the ruling ethnic group. The three principal arguments
tested, democratic-institutional, economic-social developmental, and identificational, vary in the
degree to which they impose concrete measures for accountability on the regime and the potential they
hold for diverting popular attention from the regime's ethnic nature. Because democratic-institutional
arguments impose the most concrete mechanisms for accountability on the regime and have the lowest
potential to divert attention from ethnic divisions, I hypothesize that they will be most commonly
employed by regimes whose ethnic group has a significant level of dominance and least commonly
employed by those with little or no dominance. Identificational arguments run the other way, offering
few concrete criteria for accountability and carrying significant potential to supplant the salience of
3 "Yemen: A Shia Shadow," The Economist (375:8427), May 21, 2005; "Disappearances and Arbitrary Arrests in the
Armed Conflict with Huthi Rebels in Yemen," Human Rights Watch report, October 2008.
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ethnicity, and should therefore become increasingly favored as the regime's dominance decreases.
Middle levels of dominance should have the highest levels of economic-social developmental
arguments, for the moderate accountability mechanisms they establish and diversionary potential they
offer. With a ruling group comprising 63% of the population, we should expect the speeches of the
Yemeni regime to have particularly high levels of economic-social developmental arguments,
absolutely and relative to democratic-institutional and identificational arguments.
The content analysis conducted in this project reveals moderately high levels of economic-
social developmental arguments in comparison with other countries (18.96%, ranking third of the eight
countries evaluated), which is indeed high relative to both the presence of identificational arguments
overall and the religious (12.59%) and ideological (0%) composite identities, but the composite pan-
Arab identificational and especially the democratic-institutional arguments are much higher than we
might expect, with values of 19.54% (ranking third) and 20.64% (ranking first) respectively. The focus
on these arguments detracts from the healthy nationalist focus we might anticipate, reducing it to the
second lowest of all countries studied (albeit, at 47.03%, not significantly lower than several others).
As noted, President Saleh's speeches have a significant focus on economic-social
developmental contributions of the regime, both past and future. That he desires to give it special
emphasis is indicated by its presence at the very beginning of his speeches - he regularly launches into
a list of government programs under way within the first few paragraphs, and in many cases it
comprises the first substantive material he discusses. Despite always citing some successes ("In spite
of the political and financial challenges our country has faced and challenges of the world financial
crisis which badly affected the strongest world economies, we have achieved great accomplishments at
the levels of construction, development, democracy and social progress (Yemen 2010)"), Saleh focuses
much more on developmental plans than past developmental successes, demonstrating awareness of
Yemen's laggard rate of modernization and the challenges that exist as a result. References to the
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country's "economic shortcomings" are not uncommon (Yemen 2006 et al.). Steering attention toward
the government's efforts to catalyze development, one particular topic President Saleh emphasizes is
the construction of basic physical infrastructure in the country: "Efforts will continue to achieve more
service and development projects. On top of the achieved projects was the modern roads network
which reached to around ten thousands kilometers. This network connected the different parts of the
country and facilitated the implementation of service projects in all areas. In regard to the construction
of water dams and reservoirs, about 1250 projects were implemented while over 600 others are under
construction (Yemen 2004)." He also touts the government's plans to develop a unified national
curriculum for schools and encourage the diversification of resources and industries, with a particular
focus on encouraging entrepreneurial and scientific advancements (Yemen 2005, 2010, etpassim).
As the above citation suggests, the President is prone to delve into specifics, which reinforces
the impression that his discussion of economic-social developmental programs are intended to impress.
He is equally prone to openly identify Yemen's problems. For example, he admits to the rampant
unemployment facing the country. It is noteworthy that Saleh speaks of "reducing unemployment"
rather than, for example, increasing employment opportunities (Yemen 2005, 2009). He expresses his
negative view of the country's current circumstances that the country in another speech: "The tasks of
construction and its challenges are not simple. Our country still has many concerns, especially the
development concern for which all efforts should be consolidated to achieve goals of economic
progress and improve the living standards of citizens (Yemen 2006)." That he openly articulates the
problems facing the country, as well as the specific plans his regime has implemented or will
implement to resolve them, suggests his comfort with setting forth criteria against which his people
will hold his regime accountable.
President Saleh emphasizes past or future economic-social developmental plans as we expect,
but the number of democratic-institutional evocations are surprisingly high. As noted above, Yemen
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has the strongest focus on democratic-institutional arguments of all countries studied. Not only are
there are a surprising number of evocations, but the amount of attention Saleh wishes to draw to the
country's democratic institutions is unanticipated. This focus is reflected in its appearance at the
beginning of his speeches, sometimes even before developmental achievements. He frequently begins
a speech by offering "greetings of freedom, democracy, and unity (Yemen 2004, 2005, 2008)." This
particular triad appears often in his speeches, at the beginning as well as elsewhere. Indeed, the
frequency with which he refers to Yemen as the Republic of Yemen is noteworthy in comparison with
other evaluated leaders. While many countries' leaders are fond of bandying about words or phrases
with democratic connotation, Saleh cites the specific steps his regime is taking to further advance
democracy and even couples it with philosophic waxing on the merit of democracy:
The establishment of the Republic of Yemen coincided with the adoption of democracy,
multi-party system and political pluralism, and reactivation of the role of civil society
institutions. The widest political reform process was achieved in our country either
through the embodiment of the peaceful succession of power and holding free
parliamentary, presidential and local elections or the establishment of constitutional
institutions,widening popular participation in decision making, women participation,
freedom of opinions, freedom of press and respect of human rights. Our adoption for
democracy was emanated from our belief that democracy is the choice of the modem
age and the foundation for construction, progress and real embodiment for people's
running their own affairs.
The homeland has become bigger by its unity and democracy and its weigh and role in
different regional, national and international events were enhanced. Based on this fact,
our country has hosted several democratic conferences and activities including the
Emerging Democracies Conference, Sanaa Conference on Democracy, Human Rights
and the Role of the International Criminal Court and the Conference of the League of
Senates and Equivalent Councils in Africa and the Arab World. These activities created
unprecedented world image for our country. The " Sanaa Declaration" came to affirm
the principle of enhancing democracy, widening the popular participation, establishment
of civil society institutions, respect of human rights and extending bridges of dialogue,
contact and understanding among religions and civilizations. The declaration provided
an objective and comprehensive vision which represents today an essential foundation
for political and democratic reforms presented in the region. We in the Republic of
Yemen welcome reforms that guarantee cementing democracy and widening the popular
participation in the decision making. These reforms should come from within the will of
peoples and go in harmony with their characteristics and fulfill their ambitions. It is an
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opportunity to call upon everyone in the country especially political parties and
organizations to enrich democracy with more democratic and responsible practices
within the framework of commitment to the institution, executive laws and national
principles away from vexations that could harm the homeland (Yemen 2004).
The philosophical merit of democracy always appears alongside specific practical measures the regime
is taking to this end. Overall, the strong pragmatic focus of Saleh's speeches, characterizing his
economic-social developmental as well as his democratic-institutional arguments, suggests a comfort
with suggesting to the public a rubric against which his regime will be held accountable. That one such
rubric is its following of democratic procedures and establishment of functional democratic
institutions, which actually include a mechanism by which this accountability can threaten the regime's
rule, indicates particularly strong comfort.
The regime's seriousness about promoting economic-social developmental and democratic-
institutional arguments is made even more evident by the fact that discussions in those veins are
coupled with explicit discussions of the government's efforts to stop corruption in both arenas. In some
cases it is embedded in an economic-social developmental argument:
The government should also implement all goals and aims included in development
plans especially in the second five-year development plan. The government should
continue economic, financial and administrative reforms in a parallel line with efforts to
combat and uproot corruption. The government should wage a severe war on corrupters
wherever they are. No single opportunity should be left for corruption and corrupters.
We stress on the necessity of accelerating the approval of the international treaty to
combat corruption. The legislative authority and the central organization for auditing
and control should fulfill their duties against corrupters taking into account accurate and
precise information away from vexatious intentions. Those who are responsible for
monitoring corrupters should strike a good example by behavior, honesty and
conscience (Yemen 2004).
Elsewhere, however, the discussion of corruption appears within a democratic-institutional argument.
President Saleh emphasizes the importance of legitimacy of democratic processes; as he assures,
"Preparations are underway to hold the election in democratic, honest and safe atmospheres and in an
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absolute transparency (Yemen 2006)." Saleh cites the enactment of an anti-corruption law as well as
the establishment of an institution, the Supreme National Authority to Combat Corruption, to support it
(Yemen 2006, 2008). The emphasis on uprooting corruption further emphasizes Saleh's comfort with
his regime being held accountable for economic and social developmental progress as well as
functional democratic institutions.
Saleh's speeches do not reflect an over-strong emphasis on identificational arguments (32.13%,
fourth out of eight). There are zero ideological evocations. Religious identity evocations are present,
but not in an overwhelming quantity (12.93%, six out of eight, and very similar to most higher-
dominance countries). Aside from the occasional interjectional invocation, most of the evocations
appear in one of three contexts: entreaty for blessing or attribution of something as blessed; discussion
of issues relevant to the Islamic world, and allusions to martyrdom. Saleh repeatedly speaks of
"blessed unity (Yemen 2005, 2006, 2008, inter alia)," to the point that the phrase becomes epithetic. As
for references to the Islamic world, the President occasionally treats the problem of Islamist terrorism,
emphasizing the importance to Muslims of remedying this: "Dialogue is also an important method and
Muslim clergies should fulfill their role in orienting the youths and protecting them from misleading
ideas that end in extremism and terrorism (Yemen 2004)." Otherwise he simply refers to the existence
of issues for the Islamic world: "In regard to Yemen stances towards Arab, Islamic and international
issues, we will remain committed to the national solid principles and Arab and Islamic rights (Yemen
2006)." Finally, the word "martyr" comprises a large number of the evocations, generally used to recall
the country's war dead. Many speeches begin with a tribute to them: "[Yemen's] achievements have all
been possible due to our people's struggle, and the martyrs who fell while defending the revolution and
unity. I salute all those faithful martyrs and pay them tribute (Yemen 2011);" "Our people was able to
achieve its greatest accomplishment in an expression of loyalty to the sacrifices of the homeland's
martyrs (Yemen 2004)." Overall, President Saleh does not seem overly interested in evoking an
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ideological or religious identity.
Despite the lack of strong presence of identificational evocations overall, Saleh does evoke a
pan-Arab identity with some frequency (19.54%, third out of eight). His evocation of the Arab identity
is quite similar to that of other countries, mainly consisting of expressions of concern over current Arab
trouble spots such as Palestine, Iraq, Sudan, and Somalia and advocacy of political solutions for them.
Though there is occasional moralizing - reference to "Israeli arrogance," for example (Yemen 2005) -
the Arab identity evocations are not especially provocative. Saleh, for example, "reiterate[s] our
support for the peaceful efforts exerted by the Palestinian authority (Yemen 2005)," renew[s] our call to
all brotherly Iraqi people to work for the enhancement of their national unity and contribution in
creating a better future in light of a democratic, free and unified Iraq (Yemen 2006)," and "reiterate[s]
our continuous support for all efforts exerted for the sake of maintaining peace and stability in the
brotherly Republic of Somalia (Yemen 2009)." He appears to evoke an Arab identity primarily by
promoting sympathy for troubled Arab peoples and their relevance to Yemenis.
That President Saleh is interested in evoking an Arab identity among his population to at least
some minimal degree is suggested by his occasional mention of the Arab "nation" once he introduces
Arab concerns. This terminology is much rarer than in Saddam Hussein's speeches, though, and the
predominant identity Saleh's speeches evoke is still the national (47.03% versus 19.54%); moreover,
the shift in meaning is consistently preceded by a clear cue in the change of audience address from
"fellow citizens" to "fellow Arabs," clarifying that Arab nationality and Yemeni nationality are not
deeply entwined. That he seeks to give Arab identity minimal emphasis is reinforced by the fact that it
is consistently raised - though it is raised consistently -- at the very end of the speech.
In sum, an evaluation of President Saleh's speeches reveals a strong interest in associating his
regime with economic and social developmental success and, to a surprisingly large degree, functional
democratic institutions. Pan-Arab identificational evocations are also present, but the latter two
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dominate. This suggests that President Saleh is comfortable suggesting the existence of concrete
measures and mechanisms of accountability to his population. This does not contradict the prediction
that, based on the relative percentage of his ruling ethnic group, Saleh's regime would justify its rule
primarily with an economic-social developmental argument. The remaining paragraphs will discuss the
political implications of employing an argument that is both economic-social developmental and
democratic-institutional to justify a regime's rule.
Implications
Saleh's use of economic-social developmental and democratic-institutional arguments to justify
his regime's rule sets up his government to be held accountable for achieving developmental progress
and advancing and functioning within democratic institutions. The potential implications are clear: the
absence of perceivable developmental progress and either the absence of democratic institutions or
evidence that their functioning is less than democratic, may discredit the regime's justifying argument
and provoke threats to the regime's security. We might surmise that Saleh's emphasis on democratic
institutions may put his regime at particular risk, with such his ethnic group's dominance in a multi-
ethnic society small enough that he cannot truly permit democratic functioning without likely
sacrificing his own power.
President Saleh's Developmental and Democratic-Institutional Policies
Longtime Yemeni ruler President Saleh strongly justified the rule of his Sunni regime,
representing 63% of the population, with a dual economic-social developmental and democratic-
institutional argument, suggesting that his regime's rule is justified because of the developmental
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successes it has achieved or is on track to achieve and the functional democratic institutions in which it
is embedded. This study predicts the former, but expected less emphasis on the latter. As Saleh's
speeches indicate with their catalogues of programs implemented toward developmental and
democratic ends, his regime sincerely sought to promote economic development and democracy (albeit
without risking its power.). However, under his rule Yemen has remained the poorest Arab country,
with rampant poverty, illiteracy, and unemployment; moreover, Saleh's regime has not actually
advanced its democratic march, being instead widely considered an autocratic oligarchy.36 His
inability to show positive development in these areas, having emphasized them so heavily as the
argument justifying his regime's rule, has had negative consequences for his regime's security.
Yemen has been a locus of protests as part of the "Arab Spring," following closely upon the
authoritarian Tunisian president's ouster by popular protest. However, it is widely reported that the
contagion effect merely gave deep and widespread public discontent the catalyst it had long awaited.
The key reasons for this discontent were poor economic conditions and the perception of corruption in
both economic and governmental arenas. Protesters decried high levels of unemployment, the very
problem of which Saleh so frankly spoke. As one scholar concluded in 2010, citing recent Gallup
surveys: "What is most striking now, however, is that hope is gone; Yemenis no longer believe that
they or their government can rise out of poverty. The loss of hope has been accompanied by gradual
chaos [and] a lack of faith in the Yemeni government ( ... )."7
Protesters also voiced anger over the Saleh regime's less-than-democratic behavior. His
recently announced plan to amend the much-touted constitution to allow him remain President for life
was denounced, along with perceived rampant corruption in elections; in addition to improved
36 "Yemen Protests: 20,000 Call for Saleh to Go," BBC News, 3 February 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
middle-east-12353479; April Longley Alley, "The Rules of the Game: Unpacking Patronage Politics in Yemen," Middle
East Journal 64:3 (Summer 2010); Robert Burrowes and Catherine Kasper, "The Salih Regime and the Need for
Credible Opposition," Middle East Journal 61:2 (Spring 2007).
37 Nora Ann Colton, "Yemen: A Collapsed Economy," Middle East Journal 64:3 (Summer 2010).
D. Berman -- 44
economic conditions, Yemeni protesters are calling for "a more responsive, inclusive government."3"
As Al Jazeera reports, "What the people really want to see is for a five-man presidential council to take
control in the interim period, until elections can be held - because they simply don't believe that if
elections are held under the current regime that they will be free and fair."3 9
It is a given that both the Arab Spring phenomenon and Yemeni discontent are complicated and
multifaceted in their roots; this work does not strive to make broad causal statements about either.
Nonetheless, the case of Yemen demonstrates the risks of employing an economic-social
developmental and democratic-institutional argument to justify a regime's rule: if developmental
successes are elusive and democratic institutions less than democratically functional, the regime,
having suggested these areas as criteria along which they should be evaluated, invalidates its justifying
argument. The result is a loss of justification and, inevitably, a loss of security for the regime.
38 Ginny Hill, "What's Next in Yemen?" BBC News, 29 January 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-
12309909.
39 "Thousands in Yemen March Against Saleh," Al Jazeera, 25 March 2011,
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2011/03/201132511732578174.html.
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VI. Case Study 3: The United Arab Emirates, 1971-Present
Occasion for Annual Speech: National Day (anniversary of the establishment of the federation of
emirates)
The United Arab Emirates, established in 1971, is a federation of sovereign entities in which
Sunnis are the dominant ethnic group by far, composing 80% of the population (the remainder being
16% Shi'ites and 4% other minorities). The country is unique in the region because it has seen little
ethnic tension since its founding. Despite the continued salience of the Sunni-Shi'ite division, the two
populations manage to coexist relatively peacefully in the UAE.4 0 The federation has seen two
presidents since its 1971 founding: Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, who died in 2004, and his son
Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan, who inherited the Presidency as Crown Prince and has been in
power ever since. The challenge to the Zayed and then Khalifa regime is to prevent potential tension,
with the threat of regime destabilization it bears, from becoming real.
I argue that the argument a mono-ethnic regime in a multi-ethnic society will choose to justify
its rule will vary with the degree of dominance its ruling group has in the population, indicated by its
relative percentage. This variance is driven, I contend, by the regime's shifting ability to tolerate being
held accountable by the public and its shifting need to divert public attention from ethnicity. The latter
varies inversely proportionally with dominance and the former proportionally. The three arguments
treated in this study, democratic-institutional, economic-social developmental, and identificational,
decrease in that order in the extent to which they impose concrete measures and mechanisms for
holding the regime accountable, increase in that order in the degree to which they have the potential to
4 Discussed in, inter alia, Kristian Alexander, "Deciphering the UAE.'s Stand on Arab Revolutions," Pulitzer Center on
Crisis Reporting, 1 March 2011, http://pulitzercenter.org/articles/deciphering-uaes-stand-arab-revolutions; Christopher
Davidson, "Sunni-Shiite Hostility? The UAE Suggests Otherwise," Daily Star (Lebanon), 4 August 2008,
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Opinion/Commentary/Aug/04/Sunni-Shiite-hostility-The-UAE-suggests-
otherwise.ashx#axzzlWdQwUo20.
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detract from ethnicity. With the high relative dominance of ruling Sunnis over Shi'ites in the UAE, I
predict that President Khalifa's government would favor a democratic-institutional argument, with a
economic-social developmental argument also a strong presence and little or no focus given to
identificational arguments.
The data generally corroborates this prediction, although the presence of democratic-
institutional arguments is not as strong as we might expect (8.57%, sixth of eight) and the social-
economic developmental argument appears especially strong (33.6%, second of eight). The UAE has
the second lowest value across countries for identificational arguments overall (26.97%), with the
lowest value for religion (10.65), a zero value for ideological, but a somewhat higher value for pan-
Arab identities (16.32, fourth of eight).
President Khalifa's speeches have a surprisingly low level of democratic-institutional
evocations, but they are present. They generally consist of assurances of the regime's commitment to
democracy. As President Khalifa offers in one example: "We say with confidence that we will pursue
the development of our capabilities, modemise our institutions, restructure practices in order to achieve
our aspirations to live in a society, where justice and rule of law prevail and in a state devoted to the
values of integrity, accountability, transparency, rights, freedoms and respect, promote thinking and
analysis, creativity, and encourage dialogue, expression of opinion, participation in decision-making as
per devotion to the values of loyalty and belonging to the homeland, preserve the prestige and
sovereignty of the state, and national security and safety (UAE 2009)." On another occasion he
similarly states: "We will embark on a march that culminates in more participation and interaction
from all the citizens of the country. My dear countrymen and women, today, we stand at a threshold of
a new era, whose ultimate objective is to entrench the rule of law and due process, accountability,
transparency and equal opportunity (UAE 2005)." Elsewhere he clarifies, "Our policy is based on the
commitment to the principles of the UAE constitution (UAE 2010)." On several occasions President
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Khalifa explicitly extends political rights to women: "The UAE is working to enable women play their
role in serving the society. To successfully achieve this, laws have been promulgated to protect their
constitutional rights and to give them the opportunity to participate in legislative and executive
institutions and in the decision-making process (UAE 2005)." Overall, President Khalifa's democratic-
institutional evocations are general and keyword-oriented, lacking in specifics; nonetheless, the
presence of general and keyword-oriented evocations suggest that the regime is not uncomfortable with
the democratic process and being evaluated based on its presence.
Khalifa's speeches are heavily populated with economic-social development references. The
value of 33.6% means that on average, over one-third of each speech is spent discussion past or future
development successes. His discussions of developmental plans are frank and reflect the existence of a
cohesive plan, or even explicitly state as much: "The government is working hard to achieve social
development, to improve quality of life and to realize its developmental goals through a comprehensive
national vision that aims to provide excellent educational standards, adequate housing and world class
healthcare services in a sustainable environment. It also seeks to offer a highly advanced social welfare
system that enables citizens to face hardships and challenges of life, improve public services, to
empower women, support young people, to protect and care for mothers and children, senior citizens
and people with special needs (UAE 2010)." His speeches all follow a similar pattern, listing with
particular emphasis the government's progress in and efforts to further improve human development
(including labor laws and education), investment and entrepreneurship, infrastructure, technological
and scientific advancement, and the training and employment of women. The President cites specific
laws and institutions the government has established, such as the Supreme Council for Mother and
Child Care (UAE 2004), Sheikh Zayed Housing Program (UAE 2005), UAE Investment Authority
(UAE 2007), and a law created to establish the National Authority for Qualifications (for education)
(UAE 2010).
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Economic success is regularly the first topic raised in the President's speech, as exemplified in
2010: "As our nation is bracing for its 40th year of achievements, we assure you that we are moving
from a strength to more strength, and that we are reaping the fruits sowed by our forefathers in terms of
best practices, building the nation's institutional and legislative frameworks, enjoying a strong,
diversified and free economy, a modem infrastructure, a sustainable social development, enhanced
cultural and societal identity and most importantly, preparing capable and skilful human resources
(UAE 2010)." The early mention of economic-social developmental successes continues after the
onset of the global economic crisis:
Dear Citizens, on this occasion, we would like to assure everyone that our country is
stronger and better off, since our economy is fine and our society enjoys welfare. The
global financial crisis on its severity will not be a reason for hesitation or retreat, not a
justification to lead us to a despair or inaction. We are confident that our people and the
sources of our strength will continue steadily and consistently in implementing what we
have adopted in terms of the strategies and plans.
We will continue to ply with confidence and optimism the national capacity, and solid
economy. We are grateful to God for endowing us with strong national economy and
sound policies to overcome the most difficult stage of the crisis. The economic
indicators of the growth in most sectors started to grow up gradually, beginning from the
last quarter of this year (UAE 2009).
It is significant that President Khalifa emphasizes the role of "sound policies" in minimizing the effect
of the crisis on the country and "strategies and plans" that will "continue;" he clarifies that the regime's
successful management of the crisis will only further the successes it has already achieved. As he says
elsewhere in the same vein:
The transformations experienced by our economy do not come from a vacuum, but
through the regulations and standards to establish a new economic model, based on the
philosophy and practices of community-based components of reality. This model is able
to move us from the stage of gradual labor-intensive to a new stage, strong industry and
the high-tech, capital-intensive, knowledge-based on advanced technology,
environmental awareness to preserve the nation and protect the identity and increase
availability of real jobs for our children.
The success of the new economic model, requires from us a comprehensive clear vision,
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the order of priorities, continuation of the economic policies, finance, credit, policies
governing the labor market, emphasizing the unity of the market across the nation, link
of education and training policies to the labor market, activation of Emiratization and
replacement policy, efforts to modernize the management of the economy, and
infrastructure development in less developed regions and improve the services.
Distinguished Citizens, five years later on the post of the Head of State, strategies have
been set, legislation has been further developed, more factories have been established,
roads paved, more universities opened. Those achievements were not the end in
themselves, but the top priority was and still to build national capacity and launch
national human energy directed toward the horizons of excellence, innovation, and
competition (UAE 2009).
President Khalifa strongly alludes to the responsibility of his regime for past developmental successes
and consequent ability to advance them in the future.
It is also noteworthy that the President's speeches consistently recognize national figures of the
past or present, doing so in the context of recognizing their contribution to developmental successes.
As President Khalifa says of the Supreme Council members and rulers of the various emirates, "I
salute them for their good custodianship of our Federation and also for their sincere and tireless efforts
to administer justice, maintain security, and mobilize resources to spur the growth of our country (UAE
2007)." He gives a similar encomium to former President Zayed: "This country owes its impressive
prosperity, its distinguished international standing and its peace and tranquillity to the late Sheikh
Zayed, for these achievements were only possible through his persistence, handwork, diligence and
dedication. He led our nation into progress and prosperity over the years with prudence and patience.
He cherished a dream and devoted his life to achieving that dream, using the oil wealth to build a
modern state in which both UAE nationals and resident expatriates enjoy a decent living. His deep
sense of commitment to the welfare of his people enabled him to overcome the hurdles that stood in
his way, ultimately succeeding in bringing the country to where it is today (UAE 2004)."
The discussion of developmental successes, which, in comparison with Yemen, finds no dearth
of past achievements to tout, includes plenty of specifics. President Khalifa gives details that would
D. Berman -- 50
bore the average American listener in citing his country's "economic miracle:" "Our economic miracle
speaks for itself. The UAE's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) stood at Dh284.5 billion in the year 2003
against Dhs.6.5 billion in 1972, representing an annual growth of 13 per cent. The country has also
succeeded in diversifying its economic base, a policy that resulted in significant growth in the non-oil
sectors. Non-oil sectors accounted for about 70 per cent of the GDP in 2003, compared to 35.4 per cent
in 1972. It is our hope that the non-oil GDP will grow even further this year as we move ahead
aggressively with our diversification policies (UAE 2005)." He draws particular attention to the
UAE's comparative success and international recognition of it: "Our country is at the top, both at a
regional level and at the level of the Arab world, with regards to welfare, social development,
economic competitiveness, tourism promotion, attractiveness for investment, the use of IT technology
and other fields (UAE 2007)." Elsewhere he proudly proclaims that "the UAE has turned into the
world's renowned destination for tourism, investment and business management (UAE 2009)."
Khalifa cites this high international status as justification for keeping the country on the same path:
"Dear citizens, the spectacular achievements we have made and the high profile that our country has
gained internationally require us to work, hard and with sincerity, to preserve these gains (UAE
2007)."
In identifying new policies and goals, President Khalifa is careful to discuss them as building
upon the high development the regime has already achieved. For example, as he says in discussion of
training youth, "We have been able to make significant steps (...) [B]ut we are still at the beginning of
our journey. We still have more training and rehabilitation work to do (UAE 2004)." The same
emphasis on continuing success appears elsewhere: "We shall continue to tread the path [of progress]
(UAE 2005);" "We will continue to ply with confidence and optimism the national capacity and solid
economy (UAE 2007);" "The government will continue its quest for economic development (UAE
2009)." Overall, the quantity and quality of attention Khalifa gives to economic-social developmental
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arguments suggests he is quite comfortable being judged and held accountable for his regime's
progress in this area.
As noted, Khalifa's speeches devote little attention to developing identificational arguments.
The overall value for identifications (26.97%) and the values for composite religious (10.65%),
ideological (0%), and pan-Arab (16.32%) identities are all very low compared to other countries
evaluated. Evocations of religious identity in the President's speeches generally consist of thanking
God for the blessings that have permitted developmental successes: "We are grateful to God for
endowing us with strong national economy and sound policies (...) (UAE 2009)." These go along with
entreaties that the blessings continue: "It is from the perseverance and dedication of our founding
fathers that the nation derives its strength and pride. I pay tribute to those who have continued to keep
the beacon of this nation ever shining through their handiwork and thinking. May the Almighty Allah
bless us with strength, clear vision, and dedication so that we may continue to follow in the footprints
of our founding fathers (UAE 2007)." Similarly, at the end of one speech: "We pray Almighty God to
bless our drive for success and guide us to the right path of good for our country and its people (UAE
2005)."
Another significant category of religious identity evocations in presidential speeches are caveats
against abandoning Muslim and Arab culture in the drive to modernization and the progress toward
economic advancement inherent to it. As President Khalifa says while discussing former President
Zayed: "[He] inculcated in our hearts and minds the love for our beloved country and advised us to
keep away from any thing that could harm and contravene our heritage and our Arab and Islamic
culture. Our adoption of the modernization path and adaptation to the prerequisites of the modern time
doesn't mean by any way abandoning our values, principles and social traditions (UAE 2004)." He
makes the same point while talking of efforts to incorporate women more in professional and political
affairs: "The UAE is working to enable women play their role in serving the society. (...) This is so
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that they may play their role side by side with their male compatriots in every area of national
assignment, within the framework that protects our Islamic identity and Arab tradition and culture
(UAE 2005)."
Another noteworthy context in which religious evocations recurrently appear in Khalifa's
speeches is that of terrorism and the challenge of disassociating it from Islam. As President Zayed,
Khalifa's predecessor, stated in his final National Day speech: "We say again today what we said many
years ago, before the world became fully aware of the phenomenon of terrorism. We emphasize that
neither religion, nor international law, nor any conventions on the Rights of Man can provide any
justification whatsoever for the practice of terrorism (UAE 2003)." President Khalifa expounded on
this point in 2010: "As we condemn terrorism in all its forms, we express our concern over the
growing Islamophobia - or hatred for Islam. We urge the international community to exert efforts to
prevent insults to Islam and to incite hatred against Muslim minorities (UAE 2010)."
Aside from a few references of solidarity with the Arab and Islamic world ("When a Muslim or
an Arab feels hurt, wherever he may be, that hurt also affects the people of the United Arab Emirates
(UAE 2007)"), then, most of religious evocations in the UAE President's speeches seem less like
efforts to provoke a feeling of religious identification than efforts to manage an identity that already
exists. God and the importance of his blessings are mentioned a handful of times in each speech, but
only in passing and not frequently enough to convey intentionality. Islam is mentioned after the
exaltation of economic and social modernization and a catalogue of governmental programs driving to
that end, as an assurance that it will not be totally abandoned. In sum, then, both the quantity and
quality of religious evocations in his speeches suggest that the UAE President is not overburdened with
the need to draw out a religious identity from his populace.
Although a slightly more frequent figure of his speeches, pan-Arab evocations (16.32% versus
10.35% of all evocations) also do not seem to receive an significant amount of the UAE President's
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focus. In addition to the context of assuring continued relevance despite modernization, as described
above of Islamic identity, Arab identity evocations are primarily diplomatically worded statements of
policy positions: "As for the Palestinian cause, we once again reaffirm our stand behind the
Palestinian people in their legitimate struggle and national rights to end the Israeli occupation and
establish their independent state with Jerusalem as its capital. We also appeal to our Palestinian
brethren to unify their efforts to face the difficult stage ahead and urge the international community --
mainly the US (the major peace sponsor), and the Quartet to act effectively for the resumption of the
Middle East peace process in order to end Israel's occupation of Palestinian territories, achieve
comprehensive and just peace based on international legitimacy resolutions and withdrawal of Israel
from occupied Syrian and Lebanese lands (UAE 2004)." In addition to the Israel-Palestine situation,
the President states his positions on areas of pressing Arab concerns including Sudan, Somalia, and
Iraq; Khalifa clarifies that his government's foreign policy is "based on the UAE's deep commitment to
the Gulf, Arab and Islamic identity (UAE 2004, UAE 2005)." Otherwise there are a few token
references to "our Arab nation (UAE 2007, UAE 2004)," but nothing that detracts from a strong focus
on the country of the UAE. Indeed, with 64.47% of all evocations being nationalistic, versus 26.97%
being identificational, the UAE has the second highest national focus across countries; the highest
surpasses it by a mere 4%.
The UAE is so enthusiastic about national identity and its ability to healthfully encompass all
other identities that Khalifa has been frank about his interest in promoting it: "There will be no
compromise with whatever threatens our values, our traditions and language, which are the heart of our
national identity and the soul of the nation and our heritage. (...) Any infringement of our identity is
an infringement of the country itself. Simply, it is a violation of the country's sanctity. In this
connection, we have instructed that new year that lies ahead for the federation shall be the year of
National Identity, to strengthen the national elements and components of our society and to specify the
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threats to them (UAE 2007)." Overall the UAE President shows little interest in evoking any identity
besides national; his strong focus on economic-social developmental successes and, to a lesser degree,
democratic institutions and practices leaves little doubt that he desires to justify his government's rule
with its ability to achieve in these latter areas, rather than in the pursuit of supra- or subnational
identificational interests. This suggests a comfort with the concrete measures and mechanisms of
accountability that economic-social developmental and democratic-institutional justifying arguments
impose, as well as a lack of need to make ethnicity less salient.
Implications
The above examination concludes that the UAE regime favors an economic-social
developmental argument to justify its rule to the populace. The potential implications of employing this
type of argument is as discussed in the case study of Yemen - if the government cannot sustain
economic and social development, its justifying argument becomes nullified and its security can suffer
as a result. In the case of the UAE, the connection between regime security and an economic-social
developmental argument may even be suggested by the surprising lack of destabilization the regime
has suffered amid rampant regional protests.
President Khalifa's Developmental Successes
As their speeches indicate, both President Khalifa and his predecessor President Zayed worked
toward developing the country with great enthusiasm and dedication. The result is that, as Khalifa
himself points out, the UAE is one of the top performing economies in the world. It is also one of the
fastest-growing economies in the world. While blessed with vast oil wealth, the ruling regime has
D. Berman -- 55
chosen to devote the income from it toward development, yielding an burgeoning and increasingly
diversified economy and a healthy, educated, technologically-advanced society.41
The UAE's neighbors have seen widespread destabilization with the pro-democracy "Arab
Spring" protests, with regime change being called for or effected in nearby Egypt, Bahrain, and even
adjacent Yemen. However, despite being less democratic than any of these three states - having a
Polity IV score of highly undemocratic -8 versus -3 (Egypt), -7 (Bahrain), and -2 (Yemen) - the UAE
has generally remained an island of stability.42 Analysts agree that what has insulated President
Khalifa's highly autocratic regime is its developmental success. As journalist Angela Shah observes:
"To understand why the Arab Spring has largely passed by the United Arab Emirates, take a moment to
listen to Naser Al Hammadi. 'What more do we need?' says the 30-year-old electrical engineer. 'Here,
everything is taken care of. Our education. Our health care. We have free housing. ,,43 As Shah notes,
the U.A.E.'s wealth has shielded it from the sort of economic pressures that have sparked unrest
elsewhere in the region. Bank analysts in the UAE agree, as expressed in an April report: "For all its
debt woes and recent economic slump, the UAE's combination of vast hydrocarbon wealth and a
dynamic export-oriented service sector has created an economy that has delivered growth and relative
prosperity to its small local population." 44 Current reports even suggest that the Khalifa regime has
made the Arab Spring profitable for the country.4 5
In the words of one New York Times article, the Khalifa regime has withstood protests on the
level of its neighbors because of its ability to sustain the social contract it made with the population:
41 Sources for economic data: International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Social data from World Health
Organization and CIA World Factbook. See also "UAE: Country Profile," BBC News, 10 February 2011,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/countryprofiles/737620.stm
42 Polity Scores from 2008. http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm#naf
43 Angela Shah, "Why the Arab Spring Never Came to the UAE," TIME Magazine, 18 July 2011,
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2083768,00.html.
44 Frank Kane, "Bank Says UAE Will Come Through Regional Unrest Intact," The National (UAE), 30 March 2011,
http://www.thenational.ae/business/economy/bank-says-uae-will-come-through-regional-unrest-intact.
4 "Arab Spring to Boost UAE Economy, ArabianBusiness.com, 26 May 2011,
http://www.arabianbusiness.com/videos/arab-spring-boost-uae-economy-401751 .html.
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"The allegiance of emiratis (...) to their rulers is underpinned by a social pact in which they receive
benefits including free health care, education and even housing, along with guaranteed monthly
salaries and subsidized food and fuel, paid for from the federation's vast oil revenues." 4 6 In short,
while discontent is not totally nonexistent, the regime has won favor with the population for its ability
to deliver.4 7
That said, it cannot be determined whether the regime's stability derives from its ability to
deliver on its promises or simply to deliver per se. That is, it is hard to distinguish whether the regime
has won popular compliance because it has corroborated its justification of its rule on its own terms or
simply because such economic and developmental success gives the population less of an incentive to
rebel. However, this examination has established that the Zayed and then Khalifa regime justified its
rule on the premise of its ability to generate developmental success, being comfortable setting up
measures and mechanisms of accountability because of the high dominance its ruling Sunnis enjoy;
recent events have shown that in fact generating developmental success has insulated the regime from
destabilization. Whether the regime has gained public allegiance by proving itself with the criteria it
provided for evaluation or is simply benefiting from financial security proving a public soporific, will
only become clear by witnessing the future fortunes of the regime.
46 Angela Giuffrida, "Tensions Beneath the Stability in the UAE.," New York Times, 29 June 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/30/world/middleeast/30iht-M30-UAE-POLITICS.html?ref=unitedarabemirates.
47 Kristian Alexander, "Deciphering the U.A.E.'s Stand on Arab Revolutions," Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting, 1
March 2011, http://pulitzercenter.org/articles/deciphering-uaes-stand-arab-revolutions.
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V1I. Case Study 4: Bahrain, 1971-Present48
Bahrain is ruled by King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa. Before declaring Bahrain a kingdom in
2002, King Hamad ruled the emirate of Bahrain as Sheikh Hamad after the death of his father in 1999,
who had ruled since the country's independence from the United Kingdom in 1971. King Hamad's
Sunni regime represents a mere 30% of the population, the remaining 70% being Shi'ite. Minority
Sunni dominance was a legacy of British rule that the two Khalifa leaders perpetuated. The Sunni-
Shi'ite division in Bahrain has remained salient, and Shi'ites have occasionally protested against their
marginalization. Notable protests occurred in the late 1990s, around the time of the transition in
leadership to the current King, in which Shi'ites called for representative government as well as a better
economic disposition.49 Consequently, King Hamad's regime faces the challenge of preserving his
regime from a marginalized majority, leaving him little ability to tolerate accountability and greatly in
need of diverting attention from ethnicity.
This study maintains that the argument a mono-ethnic regime will use to justify its rule in a
multi-ethnic society is primarily driven by the relative dominance of its ethnic group, because the
ruling group's relative dominance determines the degree to which it can endure public accountability
without committing political suicide and the extent to which its survival requires reducing the salience
of ethncity. The principal arguments discussed here - democratic-institutional, in which rule is
justified by the embedding of the regime in a democratic system of laws and institutions; economic-
social developmental, in which rule is justified by the regime's ability to generate developmental
successes; and identificational, in which rule is justified based on the regime's ability to pursue the
interests of a common supranational identity - all vary along these two axes, decreasing in the above
48 It is important to note that the Bahraini speeches analyzed precede the Arab Spring uprisings.
49 "Assessment for Shi'ites in Bahrain," Minorities at Risk Project, updated 31 December 2006.
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/assessment.asp?groupld=69201.
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order in the degree to which they impose criteria and mechanisms of accountability on the regime and
increasing in the potential for diverting attention from ethnicity that they offer. As a regime in which
the ruling group represents a 30% minority of the population, this logic leads us to predict that King
Hamad's regime will favor an identificational argument, with supranational identification evocations
outnumbering national. Democratic-institutional evocations and attention to economic-social
developmental programs should be few.
The data from content analysis of King Hamad's speeches shows Bahrain to be an outlier in
most areas. Bahrain has a low level of total non-national identifications (31.03%, fifth highest of
eight); of the composite identities only religious makes a respectable showing, with a value of 22.13%
(third highest) in comparison with zero (ideological) and 8.9% (pan-Arab, second lowest). King
Hamad's speeches show much more interest in evoking a national identity (56.1%, fourth highest). His
economic-social developmental focus is unsurprisingly low, comprising on average only 4.93% of
speeches (second lowest). More surprising is its number on democratic-institutional evocations: at
12.03% it ranks relatively low in a cross-country comparison, fifth out of eight, but is within two
percentage points of most of the moderate- and high-dominance countries. By the numbers, it would
appear that Bahrain's leader favors an identificational argument centered on religious evocations
(22.13%, versus 8.9% and 12.03, and a comparatively minute economic-social developmental focus of
4.93%), albeit very slightly so and with a strong influence of democratic-social institutionalism. The
following paragraphs will give context to the evocations and hopefully shed light on the regime' vague
argument.
In accordance with our prediction, King Hamad appears to have little interest in portraying his
regime as justified by developmental achievements. He does cite his regime's interest in advancing the
country's development: "On this historic day, it is everybody's right to express pride over the achieved
accomplishments of the comprehensive development, in all domains. Every body has also to
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participate in confronting challenges and realizing the ambitions of the nation and the people towards
progress, prosperity, welfare and molding a shining future (Bahrain 2005);" as he says of his regime's
policies, "The target has always been to bring in every prosperity and progress and the raising of the
living standard (Bahrain 2003)." References to social development is generally similar in its
succinctness and orientation toward values instead of pragmatic specifics: "[National Day] is in
recognition of your outstanding performance and achievement that you have fulfilled on the soil of
these islands, where ages of civilization had melted together producing common values of co-
existence, tolerance and enlightenment (Bahrain 2004)." Even when King Hamad elaborates a bit
more, the attention he devotes is slight: "In this respect, we are exerting strenuous efforts to develop
specialized administrations in all sorts of services for the benefit of all the citizens in this cherished
nation, especially what pertains to housing projects, where we are keen to ensure to each single citizen,
a decent life in a healthy and secure habitation in addition to developing educational curricula and
health care for the citizens. To reinforce this trend, we have charged the economic development board
to set up a 25-year comprehensive plan covering all the land in the country to determine its use, taking
into account the interest of all (Bahrain 2005)." However, overall, King Hamad neither expounds upon
development to any extent nor delves into specifics. This is especially surprising considering the
astronomical development Bahrain has witnessed under the rule of King Hamad and his father; Bahrain
has been ranked by the UN as the fastest growing economy and has a GDP per capita higher than
Japan, France, and a host of other highly developed countries. 0 For whatever the reason, King Hamad
does not suggest comfort with his regime being held accountable for economic and social
developmental achievements.
King Hamad's speeches reflect a higher-than-expected focus on democratic institutions and
practices. Such evocations largely consist of references to Bahrain's constitution and parliament: "We
50 Source: CIA World Factbook. Data from 2006.
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also protect [our future] via the law that is derived from the principles and articles of the kingdom's
constitution, a formula that will not be overstepped by any individual or voice in this country (Bahrain
2003)." Similarly: "On the scale of our national dialogue and within the framework of constitutional
institutions and official tribunes, we are keen to implement understanding and conformity among
different sectors of production and different sects of the nation with regards to issues of common
concern of all citizens (Bahrain 2004)." On one occasion King Hamad explicitly expresses pride in the
country's democratic march: "Brothers and Sisters, this year's celebrations of the National Day coincide
with our passage from a phase to a new one of the democratic process (...) which is the source of our
pride. We do appreciate the sincere efforts of the legislative authority in backing up and supporting the
democratic process, in a way that contributes in a positive manner to the reinforcement of this
experience, based on solidarity and firm cooperation between the Legislative and Executive authorities
(Bahrain 2005)."
King Hamad seems particularly eager to draw attention to his interest in enhancing public
participation in the political process. As he says amid a discussion of proposed reforms: "For the sake
of these citizens, I call upon everyone to exert utmost effort in order to achieve their aspirations for a
dignified living and to maintain all accomplishments and gains that are well appreciated by the world.
Those achievements deserve every progress and follow-up with the aim to maintain the process of
participation and openness (Bahrain 2003)." The new phase of democratic advancement that King
Hamad lauds merits acclaim because it "reinforces popular participation in discussing the nation's
causes, enactment of laws, decision making and determining citizens' needs through their own
initiatives, within the framework of the constitution (Bahrain 2005)." He expresses appreciation for the
general cooperation that the population provides their government: "[Successes of the legislative and
executive councils] come after the political reform process was launched depending upon your
effective and constructive partnership that helped us shoulder the responsibility. And honestly, your
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true cooperation is gladdening, be it at freedom practices, the national and representative action, or
performance of the press, culture and arts (Bahrain 2004)." Despite the fact that he does not address
the presence of democratic institutions and practices to an overwhelming extent in his speeches, the
degree and context in which they are mentioned suggests some comfort with being held accountable
for their functioning.
With the exception of the religious, identificational evocations are uncommon in King Hamad's
speeches. As noted, his speeches have the second lowest number of pan-Arab identity evocations
among all leaders evaluated in this study. Where such mentions do appear, they are in political
contexts. For example, King Hamad expresses sympathy for the Iraqi and Palestinian peoples on the
their respective plights: "Within the framework of our Arab Joint action, we shall continue our support
and back up to our nation's causes, expressing in this respect, our concern and pain for the persistence
of the deteriorated security situation in Iraq, wishing success to the efforts aimed at achieving Iraq's
security and stability, unity and territorial integrity, the efforts which Bahrain was at the forefront of the
countries that called for and participated in. We also hope that the day is near for the Palestinian people
to restore their legitimate rights for the establishment of their independent state, with Quds as its
capital, within the framework of international legitimacy, in a way that will help attain just and
comprehensive peace in the Middle East (Bahrain 2005)." The reference to our nation in a clearly
Arab context is significant. The few remaining pan-Arab evocations refer to Arab leaders or countries
in the context of improving regional cooperation. For example, he expresses confidence that "states
and peoples of this Arab Gulf will witness further closeness (Bahrain 2004)," and references "our
brother, the UAE President, Shaikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahiyan" in the context of upcoming Gulf
Cooperation Council activity (Bahrain 2005). Such Arab identity evocations are, however, infrequent
overall.
More frequent in King Hamad's speeches are religious identity evocations. Many of these
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consist in entreaties for God's blessing, often as interjections: his speeches are peppered with "God
willing" or the like, and past or future paths are often qualified with "with God's blessings." Moreover,
they begin and end with "may God bless you all." Such evocations, as we have seen, are commonplace
in Middle Eastern leaders' speeches. A small but critical group of evocations appear in a less common
context, declaring affinity with other Islamic countries. For example, in one speech King Hamad
suggests a desire to emphasize participation in a recent Islamic summit, in the context of foreign
policy: "At the level of relations with our brotherly Islamic sates, will shall continue efforts aimed at
unifying ranks to confront threats and attempts aimed at distorting the image of our true religion and
drawing links between it and terrorism, underlining our strong condemnation of all sorts of terror acts
which endanger lives of secure and innocent people. We glad in this respect to laud the positive
outcome of the extraordinary Islamic summit, recently held in Mecca Al Mukarrama and the positive
spirit which characterized the Islamic states' leaders, which promises of a comprehensive boost of the
Islamic world, God willing, to cope with the historical movement of our contemporary world (Bahrain
2005)." This is an isolated instance, though, prohibiting a more significant conclusion than King
Hamad is not wary of the possibility that his regime's advocacy of Muslim interests will be seen as
justification for his rule. Thus, because the majority of religious references appear to be functioning
more as a way to displace responsibility for future misfortune than to evoke a Muslim identity, as was
the case with Iraq, the sizable number of religious evocations will not be considered as exercising an
identificational argument. This is supported by the fact that even the attention King Hamad devotes to
evoking religious identities is dwarfed by that he devotes to national identity, 56.1% versus 22.13%,
suggesting that he does not see the existence of countrywide parameters as endangering his rule and
therefore that he does not feel hard-pressed to evoke a supranational identity. This is surprising, as
King Hamad's rhetoric does not appear to reflect a strong perception of threat from his ruling group's
minority status within the country. We would expect this to be so if he sought to implement an
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identificational argument.
Overall, King Hamad's justifying argument is rather a puzzle. The data does not indicate a
strong preference for an identificational argument, as the relative percentage of Sunnis to Shi'ites
would have us predict, but neither does it indicate a strong preference for a democratic-institutional or
economic-social developmental argument. Particularly surprising is the fact that the former receives
significant, if not overwhelming, attention. These intriguing findings suggest that King Hamad, with
his mono-ethnic regime representing 30% of the multi-ethnic population at large, is at least somewhat
comfortable providing concrete measures and alluding to the existence of mechanisms for his
accountability, and does not feel an over-strong need to divert popular attention from ethnicity. We
reach the tentative conclusion that King Hamad does not appear to employ much of a justifying
argument at all, and what he does employ has elements of both a democratic-institutional and a
religious-identificational argument. Because many of the religious evocations appear to function more
as guarantors against being blamed for a future reversal of fortunes, I will consider his argument
primarily democratic-institutional, but only weakly so. Before turning to a discussion of the
implications of pursuing a justifying argument of this type, we will pause to consider the confounding
factors that may be influencing King Hamad's behavior.
Confounding Influences
The evaluation of King Hamad's rhetoric yields two important questions: why he appears so
comfortable being held accountable for the presence and performance of democratic institutions, and
why he does not appear concerned about promoting another identity to detract from ethnicity, which
after all renders his rule so fundamentally illegitimate. A closer look into Bahrain and the singular
position of its Shi'ites suggests that a possible confounding influence on a regime's justifying argument:
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a highly functioning state economy, especially one from which the ruled group is not excluded.
Indeed, as discussed briefly above, Bahrain has seen significant economic success; its GDP per capita
has remained at least $500 higher than the world average since approximately 1980 and nearly $1000
higher than the regional average.51 The rate of growth slowed from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s,
in parallel with the global rate of growth, but nonetheless continued to rise. Bahrainis have seen a
number of social benefits as a result of the healthy economy, including being the first people in the
region to receive unemployment benefits. 52
Overall, Bahrain's Shi'ites are considered a marginalized minority. The Minorities at Risk
project counts them as a consistently disadvantaged group, and they are reported to lack equality of
opportunity in their country. However, even under King Hamad's much more authoritarian father,
Shi'ites were encouraged to engage in economically beneficial industries, permitting them a "relatively
stable and protected way of life," in the words of one scholar.53 A 1980s study of Bahrain indicated
that business became a major outlet for Shi'ites, who at the time comprised 70% of the Bahrainis who
run and are employed in private businesses and an approximately equal percent of educated
professionals.54 It has thus been noted that "economic opportunities have offered the Shi'ites some
compensation for the religious and political discrimination exercised against them." 55 Since taking
power, King Hamad has worked toward further equalizing employment opportunities for Sunnis and
Shi'ites in society.56 While Shi'a citizens face higher unemployment and tend to be employed in less
skilled jobs in the private sector, their standard of living is not one of gross disadvantage, and many
51 Source: World Bank.
52 "Minister Lashes out at Parties Opposed to Unemployment Benefit Scheme," Gulf News, 22 June 2007,
http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/bahrain/minister-lashes-out-at-parties-opposed-to-unemployment-benefit-scheme-
1.185248. (The scheme was approved and implemented shortly thereafter.)
5 Joseph Kostiner, "Shi'i Unrest in the Gulf," in Martin Kramer (ed.), Shi'ism, Resistance, and Revolution (Boulder, CO:
Westview Press) 1987, p. 175; Uzi Rabi and Joseph Kostiner, "The Shi'is in Bahrain," in Ofra Bengio and Gabriel Ben-
Dor (ed.), Minorities and the State in the Arab World (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner) 1999.
s4 Fuad Khuri, Tribe and the State in Bahrain (Chicago: University of Chicago Press) 1981.
5 Kostiner, p. 176
56 MAR.
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Shi'ite citizens acknowledge the positive steps that have been taken since King Hamad's accession to
power. 57
There is therefore reason to believe that the country's relatively high socioeconomic status
diminished the incentives of Shi'ites to rebel (before the contagion effect from the Arab Spring became
injected into their logic). King Hamad even felt his regime's rule secure enough to permit the key
Shi'ite holiday of 'Ashura the status of a public holiday, being the only Sunni-dominated state in the
region to do so. Additionally, he has not inhibited Shi'ites from holding a large number of seats in the
elected lower house of the bicameral legislature he established, in spite of protests over the lack of
actual power wielded by this so-called democratic body.58 Thus we see that the country's economic
status has not only reduced King Hamad's need to diminish the salience of ethnicity, as this study
predicted would be a serious exigency for his regime, and allows him to promote accountability-
facilitating democratic institutions and processes with more comfort than we would expect. 59
Implications
That said, what have been the implications of employing an argument that is nominally
(religious) identificational but strongly features democratic-institutionalism to justify the rule of a
group representing 30% of the population? As the case study of Yemen suggested, the risk of
57 MAR.
58 Of course, the appointed upper house has the power to nullify any legislation enacted by the lower house, facilitating the
King's retention of his job.
59 This raises the question of why King Hamad would not implement a strongly economic-social developmental justifying
argument. This requires addressing two additional considerations: first, that the case of Bahrain suffers a serious dearth
of data, with only three speeches (2003, 2004, 2005) being available, rendering conclusions on any observed patterns
tenuous. It should be noted that the value for economic-social developmental arguments in each of the three speeches
varies but never exceeds an unimpressive 9%. The second consideration is that the speeches do allude to the country's
"successes" more frequently than this, but in terms too vague and subjective to be justifiably coded as an economic-
social developmental argument. Whether this is intentional or simply a personal rhetorical inclination of King Hamad,
cannot be determined without further research.
D. Berman -- 66
employing a democratic-institutionalist argument in any degree is that a regime sets itself up for
criticism and accountability if the institutions do not appear to actually function democratically.
Having been created by a minority regime, Bahrain's democratic institutions naturally merit much
functional reproach. The implications of this type of argument should therefore be significant, with
King Hamad setting himself up to be held accountable for the democratic nature of his institutions by
frequently referencing and even lauding their existence.
King Hamad's Democratic-Institutional Policies
King Hamad has indeed devoted great effort to presenting a democratic face to his population.
Since inheriting power he has evidenced much interest in moving away from the authoritarian regime
of his father and toward more a more participatory style of governing, or at least much interest in being
perceived as doing so. In 2001, he put forward formal proposals to turn the country into a
constitutional monarchy with an elected parliament and an independent judiciary, which Bahrainis
from all quarters strongly backed.60 His proposal, which also sought to allow freer expression and
amnesty for political prisoners, passed in a referendum vote that indicated over 98 percent approval
from the population. 61 Despite widespread criticism that actual reforms have changed little in
comparison to what was promised, and in particular that the elected house of parliament is rendered
institutionally superfluous by the veto-wielding upper house, the King has encouraged parliamentary
elections and appears to laud the purported democratic nature of his country.
However, the widespread criticism did not abate, and it would seem that the King's
"democratic" endeavors have only fueled them. A number of Shi'ite organizations boycotted 2002
60 "Bahrain: Country Profile," BBC News, 4 June 2011,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/countryprofiles/790690.stm
61 Bahrain's Sectarian Challenge, Middle East Report #40, International Crisis Group, 6 May 2005, p. 5.
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elections in protest of the little power the elected house wields; allegations of a plot to keep Shi'ites
underrepresented only hurt public opinion of the King's regime further. 62 Over time, it has been noted,
political constituencies that initially embraced the opportunity for participation have soured.63 Amid
widespread discontent, the regime was observed to undertake a campaign of repression and arrests of
Shi'ites in the run-up to the 2010 election.64 Shi'ites made a strong showing in that election, winning
18 out of 40 seats in the lower house.65 At the beginning of 2011 the Arab Spring spread to Bahrain,
with pro-democracy protests overtaking the country such that King Hamad declared a state of
emergency. As one analyst observed, unlike the demonstrations in Egypt and Tunisia, protesters in
Bahrain do not appear to be motivated by issues of poverty, but simply the desire for true democracy. 66
Overall, Bahrain is an outlier in that its' leader's justifying argument has an unexpectedly large
democratic-institutional component and unexpectedly small identificational component; I surmise that
the surprising level of security this indicates that King Hamad feels is the result of Bahrain's high
socioeconomic status (and relative inclusion of Shi'ites in the spoils), which rendered the subordinate
Shi'ites less likely to revolt and made the King's regime better able to tolerate accountability.
Nonetheless, the case of Bahrain illustrates that a democratic-institutional justifying argument is risky
because it suggests to the population that the regime can be accountable for its advocacy of and
functioning within these institutions, which the regime may only be able to advance to a point without
endangering the security of its rule. This is of course not to say that if King Hamad had implemented a
strong identificational justifying argument the Arab Spring would have passed his country by.
However, even though his argument was only weakly democratic-institutional, by lauding his country's
62 Hassan Fattah, "Report Cites Bid by Sunnis in Bahrain to Rig Elections," International Herald Tribune, 2 October 2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/02/world/africa/02iht-web. 1002bahrain.2997505.html.
63 MAR, p 6
4 "Bahrain: Elections to Take Place Amid Crackdown," Human Rights Watch, 20 October 2010,
http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/10/20/bahrain-elections-take-place-amid-crackdown.
65 "Shia Group Holds Strong Position in Bahrain Elections," BBC News, 24 October 2010,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-I 1615349.
66 Simon Atkinson, "Bahrain Economy: What Impact Will the Turmoil Have?" BBC News, 16 March 2011.
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democratic institutions King Hamad set himself up to be criticized by his population when the
democratic nature of the institutions was perceived as less than ideal, which invalidates some of the
justification for his rule as a result. That he did so with the majority of the multi-ethnic population not
being of his ruling ethnic group made this invalidation even more likely.
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VIII. Conclusion
A content analysis followed by case studies of Iraq, Yemen, and the United Arab Emirates
indicates some evidence linking the relative percentage of a mono-ethnic regime's ruling group in a
multi-ethnic society to the dominant type of argument the regime will use to justify its rule to the
population. Iraq, a minority regime, pursues a predominantly identificational argument; the UAE, a
high-dominance regime, pursues a predominantly economic-social developmental argument; and
Yemen, a moderately dominant regime, pursues a hybrid economic-social developmental and
democratic-institutional argument. A case study of Bahrain, an outlier, suggests the existence of
confounding variables that influence the two mechanisms by which I speculate ruling group dominance
drives a justifying argument - the degree to which a regime can tolerate the concrete measures and
mechanisms of accountability that some arguments impose and the extent to which they need the
potential to divert attention away from ethnicity that other arguments offer. Each case study
demonstrates that the justifying argument a regime chooses has policy implications for that regime, as
the reason he gives to validate his hold on power must be kept salient and true to avoid rule-threatening
backlash. To conclude this work I will evaluate each argument for how it performed as well as the
methodological approach and the implications of the connections found.
The Arguments: Consistencies, Curiosities, and Irregularities
Having operationalized all the arguments and examined the evidence for them in context, it is
useful to return to the arguments to discuss whether they work as the logic of this project suggests.
Each argument will be discussed in turn.
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Economic-Social Developmental Argument. Based on the logic that this type of argument
imposes some criteria against which to evaluate the regime and therefore a possible justification for
disenchantment with it, though it does not suggest a mechanism for the regime's removal; in addition to
the fact that this argument has little inherent potential to reduce the salience of ethnicity, I expected
economic-social developmental arguments to be increasingly favored as the degree of the ruling
group's dominance rises. The data, as shown on page [insert page], indicates that this is generally so.
The rough similarity in natural resources and developmental level of the countries involved
allowed us to overlook a significant potential confounding influence on whether a regime will
implement a predominantly economic-social developmental argument to justify its rule to the
population: capability for economic development. That is, we would certainly not expect a regime
ruling over an impoverished country with a low standard of living, high illiteracy, little infrastructure
and few resources to justify its rule with the promise of economic-social developmental success
regardless of its ethnic group's relative dominance in society. Conversely, a low- or moderate-
dominance state with a very high performing economy and the capacity to develop it further might be
more likely to pursue an economic-social developmental strategy than otherwise. This point is briefly
discussed in the case study of Bahrain, albeit not in the context of this type of argument. Overall,
considering that the connection between relative dominance of the ruling group and the prevalence of
economic-social developmental arguments is corroborated by contextual analyses in case studies, and
an over-high or over-low level of socioeconomic development does not appear to have influenced the
data in the cases presented here, I conclude that there is a relationship between this type of argument
and the ruling group's relative dominance in the population at large.
Democratic-Institutional Argument. This argument imposes not only concrete measures of a
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regime's success but also mechanisms for holding the regime accountable; in addition it has little or no
potential to divert the public's attention from ethnicity. I therefore expected democratic-institutional
arguments, which would likely also shift away from emphasizing democracy to emphasizing the rule of
law and institutions, to decrease in popularity as the ruling group's dominance decreased.
The data showed no identifiable relationship between these two variables, although the
speculated shift in emphasis did in fact appear. Case studies also reveal an instance where, by the
above logic, we are surprised to see a democratic-institutional argument (Bahrain) as well as an
instance where we are surprised by its absence (the UAE). While the former can be explained in part
by the greater regime security provided by a relatively high socioeconomic status, the latter suggests
that other factors might also be influencing the presence or absence of a democratic-institutional
argument. The key factor identifiable here is likely the authoritarian nature of all the regimes at hand.
Indeed, they are all authoritarian by nature, being mono-ethnic regimes in multi-ethnic society that seek
to retain dominance. This leads us to question the initial logic behind the argument's prediction-to
suspect that the mechanism by which relative dominance affects a regime's justifying argument, which
deals with the degree to which a regime can tolerate putting forward concrete measures and means of
accountability, is inadequate. It fails to account for the fact that even if a regime can tolerate such
measures and means, it may not necessarily want them. Functional democratic institutions and
practices are a threat to an authoritarian regime regardless of the relative percentage of its ethnic group.
It is therefore be useful to consider factors that influence the desirability or exigency of a democratic-
institutional argument.
The most obvious factor is homogeneity of the population, as is evident from looking at Egypt
and Jordan, where where regimes' ruling groups have the highest levels of dominance (> 90% of the
population) but low democratic-institutional values. In terms of the two mechanisms identified in this
study, such regimes may be able to tolerate accountability more but because the need to deflect from
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ethnicity effectively disappears, the motivation to incur the accountability at all diminishes. In fact, the
apparent lower need for a democratic-institutional argument among regimes ruling relatively
homogenous states suggests a broader confounding effect of homogeneity-it reduces the need for a
justifying argument, at least in the ethnic context and thus via the mechanisms identified here, overall.
While there certainly may be other internal or external factors impelling a regime in an ethnically
homogenous country to implement a democratic-institutional justifying argument, the very need for
justification in an ethnically homogenous society is fundamentally different from regimes' needs in a
multi-ethnic society. We can understand the lower-than-expected presence of democratic-institutional
arguments in Egypt and Jordan on these grounds.
In short, we might draw the theoretical conclusion that the relationship between ruling-group
relative dominance and prominence of a democratic-institutional justifying argument should be
normally distributed instead of linear. A look back at the graph of these two variables shows it to
approximate the former more closely than the latter, with the highest value, Yemen, having 63%
dominance. Indeed, the case study of Yemen revealed the hypothesized mechanisms by which relative
percentage should affect justifying argument to be working as theorized. Outliers still exist, of course
- and with such a small number of data points outliers are much more likely to significantly obscure
any pattern in the data - but with this revision a relationship between relative dominance and
prevalence of a democratic-institutional justifying argument becomes clearer.
Identificational Arguments. An identificational justifying argument attempts to validate the
regime's rule by associating it with the best interests of an identity shared between the regime and
multi-ethnic population. Thus, it fundamentally imposes few concrete means or measures of
accountability but offers much potential to divert attention from ethnicity. We therefore expected such
arguments to become increasingly prevalent as relative percentage of the ruling group decreases, as
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such regimes have little ability to tolerate accountability and a strong need to reduce the salience of
ethnicity. Identificational arguments were evaluated in this study as a summation of religious,
ideological, and pan-Arab identifies, as well as for the presence of each particular identificational
argument. The data indicated no relationship between relative dominance and ideological or pan-Arab
identificational arguments, and a small relationship between relative dominance and religious
identificational arguments as well as between the former and total identifications (the summation).
However, because religious evocations also function as a way to displace blame for past, present, or
future misfortune away from the regime, that relationship could not be corroborated in the case studies.
The small relationship between dominance and the summation identificational argument
appears to be completely driven by the sky-high number of religious and pan-Arab evocations in
Saddam Hussein's Iraq (35% dominance). Although they have a low value, ideological arguments
appear only in the Iraq case; elsewhere they have a value of zero. That said, the Iraq case worked
exactly as expected, with evidence that the regime clearly could not tolerate accountability, needed a
diversion from ethnicity, and actively sought to use identificational arguments (particularly pan-Arab)
to meet these needs. The question, then, is whether Iraq is sui generis or the other cases in which we
should expect to see more prevalent identificational arguments, namely Bahrain and (to a significantly
lesser degree) Kuwait and Yemen, are outliers.
That Bahrain is an outlier because of its high socioeconomic status has been established; we
might expect Kuwait, one of the richest countries in the world that has been classified as a high-income
economy by the World Bank, to be an outlier by the same logic. For Yemen, a much poorer state where
poverty is indeed widespread, the prevalence of an identificational argument (pan-Arab) is actually
quite high. We might therefore conclude that high socioeconomic status is a potential confounding
influence on the relationship between relative dominance and identificational justifying arguments, as it
likely is between dominance and democratic-institutional and economic-social developmental
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So much for states with unexpectedly low levels of identificational arguments, but what of
Qatar, which has a surprisingly high prevalence of pan-Arab identity evocations? Its high level of
socioeconomic development - Qatar has the second highest GDP per capita in the world 67 -- and lack
of homogeneity - albeit high dominance, 86% -- make this even more surprising. While it cannot be
definitively determined whether Qatar is sui generis, some knowledge about the country's background
suggests another possible confounding factor: discrepancy between the extent of alliance with the U.S.
and public opinion. Qatar has long been a particularly close U.S. ally in the region, especially
militarily, serving as main launching sites for the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Not
only has the regime withstood significant criticism domestically and throughout the Arab world for its
visibly close ties to Washington, recently leaked documents detail the regime's awareness of the danger
to it of appearing so pro-America as to be anti-Arab.68 We might therefore understand a
disproportionately high number of Arab identity evocations as the regime's attempt to leave no doubt as
to its Arab allegiance. This is sheer speculation, of course, and unlike the potential confounding factor
of high socioeconomic status this condition appears to apply only to Qatar. Nevertheless, the effect it
may have is clear, as is evidence of the same motivation influencing other behavior by the regime.
Ultimately only further study can determine the breadth of applicability of this particularly specific
confounding factor.
However, the significant positive relationship between ruling group dominance and prevalence
of nationalist evocations militates in favor of a relationship between dominance and identificational
67 Source: CIA World Factbook.
68 On relationship with U.S. and criticism for it, see Christopher Blanchard, "Qatar: Background and U.S. Relations,"
Congressional Research Services Report, 16 May 2011, and Francine Kiefer, "Qatar: The Small Arab Monarchy with the
Loud Democratic Voice," Christian Science Monitor; 27 May 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Editorial-
Board-Blog/2011/0527/Qatar-The-small-Arab-monarchy-with-the-loud-democratic-voice. On leaks, see Scott Shane
and Andrew Lehren, "Leaked Cables Offer Raw Look at U.S. Diplomacy," New York Times, 28 November 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/29/world/29cables.html?_r=1.
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arguments. While not properly an identificational argument itself, because in a multi-ethnic society
nationalist evocations has the potential of divisive, and especially when evoked by a mono-ethnic
regime, the decline of national identity evocations with a decline in dominance clearly suggests a
danger perceived from cultivating this identity. The desire to cultivate another potentially unifying
identity in turn would appear to follow from that. The conclusion that can be drawn is that despite a
dearth of evidence substantiating a relationship between dominance and identificational arguments,
there is some support for the theoretical expectation that it exists.
Overall, a relationship seems to exist between ruling group dominance and the prevalence of
economic-social developmental justifying arguments; if we account for the confounding factors of high
socioeconomic status and effective homogeneity, a normatively distributed relationship also seems to
exist between dominance and the prevalence of democratic-institutional arguments. Although the case
of Iraq suggests that there is some reason to believe a relationship between dominance and the
prevalence of identificational arguments exists, and potential confounding factors such as high
economic status can be assumed to be influencing regime behavior, the number of observations are
simply too few and the potential confounding variables too numerous to draw any definitive
conclusions. For this, further study is clearly necessary.
Implications
This study appears to provide some corroboration to the hypothesis that the social conditions in
a country influence a regime's justifying argument, showing in a relatively small-n study that some
relationship between the dominance of the ruling ethnic group and certain justifying arguments. This
study establishes that such relationships need further study, but also indicate that there is merit in doing
so.
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The existence of a relationship between the social underpinnings for a regime's rule and the
argument it will make to justify itself is useful to know because it indicates systematic motivations for
a regime's policies. For example, it is reasonable to expect that a regime finding it necessary employ
an economic-social developmental argument will give the highest strategic priority to ensuring
continued economic growth. More broadly, this suggests that a regime's justifying argument places
restrictions on the policies it can pursue, domestically and internationally. The destabilization Saddam
Hussein's regime suffered when he appeared to flout the interests of the pan-Arab identity he so
devotedly cultivated best illustrates this.
This implication is useful both theoretically and practically. A key object of theoretical utility is
international relations theory, in which domestic influences on foreign policy are poorly understood. If
we logically assume that a regime's justifying argument significantly influences its grand strategy by
imposing on it a strategic priority, and, as this study suggests, can establish systematic relationships
between social conditions underpinning the regime's rule and justifying argument it will employ, we
can assume systematic relationships between a certain set of social conditions and a regime's strategic
priority, and consequently the outcomes it is likely to favor. Scholarship on state preference formation
is thus a potential beneficiary from the insights this project provides.
Practical implications apply to policymakers, who can benefit from insights as to other regimes'
motivations and thus the most effective incentives to achieve cooperation. Consider as an example the
closer coordination that the U.S. seeks with China over Iran's alleged nuclear weapons program.
Grossly oversimplifying the multifaceted motivations of all countries involved, we might assume that
part of China's unwillingness to impose sanctions on its sometime Persian friend derives from the
economic-social developmental argument it has consistently employed to justify its rule to the
population, and the vast economic benefits it stands to incur from maintaining close relations with oil-
rich Iran. Understanding the domestic drivers of China's policy and potential implications for deviating
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from it can help policymakers in Washington design more incentives that are better targeted to China's
needs and thus more likely to be effective.
In sum, this project has given support to the specific hypothesis that a ruling ethnic group's
relative dominance will influence the regime's justifying argument, and subsequently to the broader
hypothesis that the social underpinnings for a regime's rule influence the justifying argument. Because
of the useful potential implications of this insight, additional work should be done not only to expand
this particular study but to determine other social conditions that might influence regime behavior and
test whether and how they do so.
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APPENDIX A: Occasions, Dates, and Sources for Speeches Used
All speeches were used in their English translations, with the translation supplied by the news
agency, media source, or scholar. Due to the possibility of error in translation, the most official
translation possible was used.
* Bahrain (2003-2005): Bahrain News Agency: http://www.bna.bh/portal/en
0 Occasion: National Day (anniversary of independence from United Kingdom in 1971)
e Egypt (1999-2002): Al Jazeera News Agency: http://english.aljazeera.net/
0 Occasion: National Day (anniversary of 1953 Revolution)
e Iraq (1998-2002): Salomon Ruysdael, Speeches of Deception: Selected Speeches of Saddam
Hussein (Lincoln, NE: Writers Club Press) 2003.
o Occasion: National Day (anniversary of 1968 Ba'thist Revolution)
e Jordan (2006-2011): Embassy of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in Washington, DC,
official website: http://www.jordanembassyus.org/new/jib/speeches/hmkaspeeches.shtml.
0 Occasion: National Day (anniversary of independence from the United Kingdom in 1946)
e Kuwait (2006, 2008-2010): State of Kuwait official website: http://www.da.gov.kw/eng/
o Occasion: Opening of Second Session of Parliament
e Qatar: (2000-2010): State of Qatar official website, webpage of H. H. The Amir Hamad bin
Khalifa al Thani: http://www.diwan.gov.qa/english/theamir/defaultnf.htm
o Occasion: Opening of Parliament (Advisory Council) Session
e UAE (2003-2005, 2007, 2009-2010): Khaleej Times
(http://www.khaleejtimes.com/index00.asp), Emirates News Agency
(http://www.wam.org.ae/servlet/Satellite?c=Page&cid= 1135099400124&pagename=WAM%2F
Page%2FW-T-P-HomeE).
o Occasion: National Day (anniversary of 1971 independence from the United Kingdom and
subsequent unification of the emirates)
e Yemen (2004-2006, 2008-2011): SABA-Yemen News Agency: http://www.sabanews.net/en/
o Occasion: National Day (anniversary of 1990 unification of People's Democratic Republic
of Yemen and the Yemen Arab Republic)
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APPENDIX B: Codin2 Rules-
1. Evocations. Evocations (democratic-institutional and identificational) are each a key word or
phrase; each evocation is coded for only one argument. To normalize for speech length, each group of
evocations was considered as (average) percent of total evocations in a particular speech. This list is
generally exhaustive, with the possibility of inadvertent omission of some infrequent synonyms of
keywords. The reader should note the conditions attached to the occasional keyword; this particular
content analysis took advantage of the small number of countries involved to enrich a strict keyword
analysis with consideration of context.
(a) Democratic-Institutional - keywords selected for their mention of or association with democracy
and/or accountability.
Keywords: democracy/democratic, parliament, constitution, parliament, vote/elect/election,
transparency, rule of law, institutions (with reference to government), name of specific democratic
institutions (the name of the state's parliament, e.g.).
(b) Identificational - keywords selected for their evocation of or association with a specific identity.
Religious Keywords: God, religious, faith, Islam or any other specific religion, bless/blessing,
miracle, martyr, heaven(s), names of biblical figures.
Ideological Keywords: Communism, socialism, capitalism, names of specific ideological
groups or beliefs (Ba'thism, e.g.).
Pan-Arab Keywords: Arab, names of Arab countries or locations (except as cited as locations
of summits or other events); names of countries or locations relevant for being antithetical to Arab
interests (Israel, Zionist/Zionism, e.g.); "nation" where the word "Arab" precedes it within the last two
sentences in the exclusion of a national reference, the phrase "Arab nation" appears earlier in the
speech in the exclusion of a state-identity reference to the nation, or context otherwise clearly indicates
reference to the Arab nation as opposed to the state. It should be noted that "nation" is consistently a
pan-Arab keyword in Iraq.
Nationalist Keywords: the name of the state, "state" where it clearly refers to the entity instead
of the government, citizens, country (except as preceded by "Arab," "Islamic," or another non-national
evocative epithet) names of leaders or state officials, names of specific state laws and institutions
without a specifically democratic identity (which are identified as democratic-institutional),
nation/national (except as a pan-Arab reference, detailed above); specific or general ("founding father")
historical national events or figures.
2. Economic-Social Developmental Achievements. The significant unit assessed here was sentence
or paragraph; they are calculated as a percentage of the full text. For sentences or paragraphs to be
69 Further study should include the corroboration of coding by two independent analysts.
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coded for this argument, their subject had to be plans, programs, or other actions taken by the regime
for the explicit purpose of development. More broadly, the sentence or paragraph must explicitly
indicate the regime accepting agency for developmental plans or successes, actual or anticipated.
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APPENDIX C: Full Coding Results of All Speeches for Each Country
Country %Sunni dom National (%Evs) Religious (%Evs) Ideolog'I (%Evs) Pan-Arab (%Evs) Dem-Inst. (%Evs) Econ-Soc (% text) IDENTL(R.+I.+P-A)
Bahrain 30 50.9 20.8 0 13.2 15.1 1.9
65 20 0 2.5 10 3.9
52.4 25.6 0 11 11 9
(avg) 56.1 22.13 0 8.9 12.03 4.93 31.03
Egypt 90 67.9 12.5 0 14.3 5.4 14
72.4 24.1 0 3.4 0 13.3
69.2 13.5 0 11.5 5.8 6.6
64.7 6 0 22.4 6.9 12.1
(avg) 68.55 14.03 0 12.9 4.53 11.5 26.93
Iraq 35 12.6 23.4 1.3 62.8 0 0
17 28.1 7.1 47.9 0 0.14
38.9 36.1 0 25 0 0
26.2 38.5 0 35.4 0 4.6
7.9 81.1 0.88 10.1 0 0
(avg) 20.52 41.44 1.86 36.24 0 0.95 79.54
Jordan 92 55.1 19.4 0 24.5 1 2
45 10.4 0 29.6 14.1 4.1
67.9 17.3 0 8.6 6.3 15.5
57.1 20.8 0 10.4 7.8 5.4
63.6 10.2 0 11.4 14.8 3.7
51.9 7.4 0 2.8 38 8.5
(avg) 56.77 14.25 0 14.55 13.67 6.53 28.8
Kuwait 60 62.5 21.9 0 1.6 14.1 2.5
46.1 44.7 0 1.3 7.9 25.4
52.4 36.1 0 0 11.5 5.3
47 32 0 0 21 8
(avg) 52 33.68 0 0.73 13.63 10.3 34.4
Qatar 86 45.2 15.7 0 30.4 8.7 40.8
25.9 32.9 0 28.2 12.9 23.8
37.5 27.8 0 22.2 12.5 23.4
45.8 14.5 0 19.8 19.8 38.9
48.5 10.9 0 20.8 18.8 33.5
64.4 6.5 0 3.9 24.7 45.4
51.1 13.3 0 28.9 6.7 50.2
54.2 7.2 0 22.9 15.7 57.3
54.3 6.8 0 32 6.8 51.9
45.2 10.3 0 39.4 5.2 40
54.9 4.9 0 32.4 7.8 55.7
(avg) 47.91 13.71 0 25.54 12.69 41.9 39.25
UAE 80 74.6 8.7 0 12.7 4 39.6
59.1 13.4 0 17.2 10.3 22.2
74 6 0 0 20 40
60.5 14.7 0 17.8 7 28.7
58.2 12.2 0 23.5 6.1 36.7
60.4 8.9 0 26.7 4 34.4
64.47 10.65 0 16.32 8.57 33.6 26.97
Yemen 63 38.6 12 0 28.3 21.1 22.3
37.9 15.2 0 19.7 21.2 25.7
46.2 12.1 0 21.4 20.2 32.6
51 10.8 0 22.5 15.7 17.3
45.9 15.3 0 29.4 14.1 20.4
50.9 12.9 0 15.5 20.7 12.8
58.7 9.8 0 0 31.5 1.6
(avg) 47.03 12.59 0 19.54 20.64 18.96 32.13
APPENDIX D: Sample Speech
Speech: 2005 National Day Speech of the UAE's President Khalifa







Econ-Soc Developmental: 994 (39.6% of full text)
Fellow Citizens, Assalam Alaikum wa Rahamatullah wa barakatu As we commemorate the 33rd
anniversary of our National Day, we do so with a deep sense of sadness and bereavement that has filled
our hearts over the passing of our father, leader and founding father of our nation- the late Sheikh
Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan.
This country owes its impressive prosperity, its distinguished international standing and its peace and
tranquillity to the late Sheikh Zayed, for these achievements were only possible through his
persistence, handwork, diligence and dedication.
He led our nation into progress and prosperity over the years with prudence and patience.
He cherished a dream and devoted his life to achieving that dream, using the oil wealth to build a
modern state in which both UAE nationals and resident expatriates enjoy a decent living. His deep
sense of commitment to the welfare of his people enabled him to overcome the hurdles that stood in his
way, ultimately succeeding in bringing the country to where it is today.
Today, the UAE stands strong and united. Its federation is as solid today as it has ever been. The
country has won for itself a respectable place among the comity of nations, thanks to its judicious
policies, its astounding achievements, its security and stability and its prosperity and progress.
Dear Citizens.
Sheikh Zayed has passed away but his spirit and impressive legacy are immortal.
His values and style of leadership will remain the beacon which will continue to guide us as we
strengthen our federation and maintain the achievements and gains that the country has made in various
spheres of developments.
As for us, we remain committed to serving this nation and to ensuring that even greater prosperity is
achieved. Despite our bereavement, I would like to say that Zayed has not left us. For he has
immortalized himself in our hearts through his noble deeds. He will remain among us forever.
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Dear Citizens With the 33rd anniversary of our federation, we have entered a new era, an era in which
we will continue to be guided by Zayed's school of thought.
In full solidarity with my brother H.H Sheikh Maktoum bin Rashid Al Maktoum, Vice President, Prime
Minister and Ruler of Dubai, and Their Highnesses, the Supreme Council Members and Rulers of the
emirates, we will continue not only to sustain the gains of the UAE people but also to seek to achieve
an even greater prosperity for our country. The efforts of Their Highnesses the Rulers of the emirates
and their strong sense of dedication will continue to be an invaluable asset. The best tribute that we
could pay to Sheikh Zayed is by following in his footsteps and maintaining the prosperity of our
people, which was his paramount concern.
Dear citizens, The UAE under the leadership of Sheikh Zayed made formidable strides in every sphere
of development. These achievements are too numerous to recount, albeit visible and tangible.
In short, Sheikh Zayed's achievements are simply unparalleled, and he will go down in history as the
leader who successfully struck an amazing balance between nation-building and the development of
human resources. His achievements were almost miraculous.
are His visionary leadership, strong resolve and great generosity have all combined to constitute a set
of values upon which the UAE citizens will carry on the march of progress of their country.
Our economic miracle speaks for itself. The UAE's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) stood at Dh284.5
billion in the year 2003 against Dhs.6.5 billion in 1972, representing an annual growth of 13 per cent.
The country has also succeeded in diversifying its economic base, a policy that resulted in significant
growth in the non-oil sectors. Non-oil sectors accounted for about 70 per cent of the GDP in 2003,
compared to 35.4 per cent in 1972. It is our hope that the non-oil GDP will grow even further this year
as we move ahead aggressively with our diversification policies.
As part of our diversification policy, we have attached great importance to industrial development and
this has resulted in the emergence of many industrial firms. Consumer and manufacturing firms are
now a feature of the UAE economy.
The country has also gained an international reputation in the exhibitions and tourism industry, thanks
to its stability and security, its strategic location, and its modern infrastructure. Within the next few
years, we will see massive tourism projects, including tourism resorts, commercial malls and the
upgrading of the country's airports.
This successful economic move has had a positive impact in all of the services sectors. With the
positive indicators of these economic achievements, we succeeded in building our modern
infrastructure and then proceeded to new areas of national tasks. We have been able to make significant
steps in the training and rehabilitation of our youth, who have now began to take up their right places in
terms of national duties. But we are still at the beginning of our journey. We still have more training
and rehabilitation work to do.
The training of all capable UAE nationals so that they may go into productive ventures is the country's
major objective, and the one to which we give all our attention and concentrate all our efforts.
Opportunities for employment in Government are no longer enough to cater for our youths who
continue to graduate from institutions of higher learning. This has made it necessary for the private
sector to play a national role in response to the support provided to it by the government. This role is to
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absorb all our sons and daughters who complete their education and it is now high time that the private
sector played a proper role in providing employment for UAE nationals seeking jobs.
The types of work change from generation to generation and from time or time, and this means that we
must provide training opportunities to match, and to provide an educational system that is orientated
towards modernization and development, so that it meets with current needs and the demands of the
labour market. We will stand firmly with these educational institutions, and will offer them unflinching
support so that they may discharge their duties effectively.
Although reports from the United Nations and its affiliated organizations show that the UAE has
achieved, and continues to achieve, high rates of development of its human resources, we will continue
to exert more efforts to provide better services for our citizens. The 2003 national budget targeted the
maintenance of high quality health, educational and social services. The setting up of the Marriage
Fund and the Supreme Council for Mother and Child Care are clear indications of our commitment to
activate the role of the family, through which we now strive to solve the country's demographic
problem.
My dear brother citizens, The UAE is working to enable women play their role in serving the society.
To successfully achieve this, laws have been promulgated to protect their c.n si i i onl rights and to
give them the opportunity to r 1icpate in legislative and executive isuUtIns and in the decision-
making process. This is so that they may play their role side by side with their male compatriots in
every area of national assignment, within the framework that protects our Islamic identity and Arab
tradition and culture.
UAE women have made tremendous progress in various areas at the local and international levels.
They have boosted their role in social service and now occupy the highest executive posts in the new
government. We shall continue to tread the path of the great leader in providing all the necessary
support for women and to open up for them all opportunities to icip atc in various areas of national
work.
We shall continue our efforts to provide appropriate and modem housing facility for every UAE
national, no matter where he might be. The Sheikh Zayed Housing Programme is a big addition to this
strategy. The programme seeks to establish integrated housing complexes and provides grants and
assistance to UAE nationals in all parts of the country. An estimated Dh6O billion will be invested in
the country's real estate sector in the next five years.
The preventive and curative services in our health facilities have reached impressive high standards
using state-of-the- art-technology like radiology and nuclear medicine. The government has been
undertaking since 2001 a five-year plan to set up a number of new stations and networks for power and
water.
The late Sheikh Zayed has laid down concrete foundations for striking harmony and balance between
sustainable development and the protection and conservation of the environment. He worked
unprecedented miracle by turning the desert into green lush farm, forests, oases and parks. We will
work hard to preserve the civilisational legacy left behind by our father and leader the late Sheikh
Zayed who inculcated in our hearts and minds the love for our beloved country and advised us to keep
away from any thing that could harm and contravene our heritage and our Arab and Islamic culture.
Our adoption of the modernization path and adaptation to the pre-requisites of the modern time doesn't
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mean by any way abandoning our values, principles and social traditions.
We are adopting all factors of progress in order to keep abreast of, and interact with the world around
us, but, we, at the same time, stick to our national character and originality.
Dear nationals, Our Armed Forces have made major successive strides in building their self-capabilities
and introducing advanced and sophisticated military technology, thus possessing the ability, force,
vigilance and high efficiency aided by what we have provided them from high national qualified and
specialized manpower in all fields. The role of the Armed Forces is not confined to the routine missions
of maintaining security and stability for nationals and residents in the country, but have also carried out
major humanitarian operations credited by the international forums.
The Police Force is also a major contributor to security and stability thanks after it has been equipped
with modern systems and all factors of success. This helped it to become competent and able in
fighting all forms and kinds of crimes.
As a result, crime rates in the country dropped to its lowest level in comparison to other countries,
making us very proud of its national personnel which has proven high efficiency and competence to
absorb modern technology, which in turn, helped them do their duties properly.
Dear nationals, The prominent place and high esteem and respect earned and enjoyed by the UAE at
international scene is a fruit of our firm principles of foreign policy whose foundations were laid by the
late Sheikh Zayed. This policy is based on the UAE's deep commitment to the Gulf, Arab and Islamic
identity, its interest to boost and expand relations of friendship with other countries of the world,
respect for neighbourhood and sovereignty of states and their territorial integrity, non-interference into
other states' internal affairs, settlement of disputes through peaceful means, commitment to the UN
Charter and other international laws and conventions.
On the regional plane, we will continue to join hands with our fellows in the GCC to enhance joint
GCC action in order to complete building and integration of its political, economic, social and security
structures. We are confidently looking forward for the upcoming GCC summit in Bahrain.
We have high hopes that the GCC would be able achieve more valuable gains that will consolidate its
drive towards progress and prosperity. We hereby reiterate the UAE's support for the Iraqi people with
all its resources for their interest, dignity and stability. We also call our brethren in Iraq, in these
delicate circumstance, to close their ranks and work hand-in-hand under the umbrella of national
accord so as to hold the general I and restore stability, security and prosperity to sister Iraq.
As for the Palestinian cause, we once again reaffirm our stand behind the Palestinian people in their
legitimate struggle and national rights to end the Israeli occupation and establish their independent state
with Jerusalem as its capital. We also appeal to our Palestinian brethren to unify their efforts to face the
difficult stage ahead and urge the international community -mainly the US (the major peace sponsor),
and the Quartet to act effectively for the resumption of the Middle East peace process in order to end
Israel's occupation of Palestinian territories, achieve comprehensive and just peace based on
international legitimacy resolutions and withdrawal of Israel from occupied Syrian and Lebanese lands.
We warmly welcome the current peace process in Sudan and pray the Almighty God to make these
efforts succeed in bring about just and lasting peace, enabling that sister Arab country to pool its
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energies and resources towards a overall socio-economic development.
Dear brethren, We are for a world in which the spirit of justice, equality, responsibility, affective
solidarity would prevail in facing problems faced by the humanity. However, anti-terror campaign
should not turn the world attention away from more dangerous, serious and urgent issues like poverty,
hunger, disease, ignorance, wars, corruption, repression and social injustice. Tackling these issues is of
very crucial importance because terrorism grows and prospers only in such an environment like this.
We renew our condemnation and denunciation of all forms and manifestations of bigotry, hatred and
terrorism as they are running counter to the principles and values of our divine religions and the
humanity at large. We use all our to coordinate and cooperate with the international community to fight
terrorism regardless of its source, reasons and place.
We have recently issued an anti-terror crimes law which sets deterrent punishments for the perpetrators
of these crimes.
As for the issue of our three islands occupied by Iran, we renew our call for Iran to settle the issue
through direct dialogue and talks according to a clear-cut agenda or as per principles of the
international law including the referral of the case to the International Court of Justice, if there is a
need for that. We believe that the best way to iron out difference between nations is through building
good relations based on mutual respect, good neighbourhood and reciprocal interests. This environment
opens promising horizons for fruitful cooperation between the countries of the region in one hand and
with other counties of the world on the other.
Dear nationals, We hereby renew our allegiance to our leader and maker of our modern UAE the late
Sheikh Zayed may God rest his soul in peace that we shall work diligently in all domains to preserve
our national gains and make more achievements in terms of progress and prosperity.
We are looking forward to you as an active, dynamic driving force in the national work. We are
confident that you will spare no effort to usher into a new era of national development in order to give
more strength to our federation, make more progress to ensure promising future for our next
generation. We pray Almighty God to bless our drive for success and guide us to the right path of good
for our country and its people.
(The Emirates News Agency, WAM)
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